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ABSTRACT
The World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations food agency, has recently acquired the difficult
task of transporting aid into the Somali region of Ethiopia. The political instability, rebel activity, ethnic
tensions, and poor infrastructure in the area endanger and delay the flow of commodities through the
WFP's supply chain. In this thesis, we explore and analyze the role that these threats play in the WFP's
aid distribution in the Somali region. Specifically, we measure the impact of insecurity in the WFP's
distribution system, study the current methods that the WFP employs to mitigate risks, and investigate
possible precautionary technologies to improve security in this resource constrained environment. Our
research suggests that while many tools can enhance security, the organizational measures aiming to
increase responsibility and trust between all involved supply chain stakeholders ultimately prove to have
a stronger impact on the overall safety of aid-distribution. Finally, though our research has focused
mainly on the WFP, we believe that all similarly situated humanitarian organizations will find our
analysis applicable.
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Jarrod Goentzel
Title: Executive Director, Masters of Engineering in Logistics Program
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1 INTRODUCTION
Both commercial and humanitarian organizations require the secure distribution of goods, as both
depend on the safe arrival and consumption of goods for success. However, while the commercial
sector has the funding, manpower, and technology to more securely distribute their products, the
humanitarian sector often does not. Many humanitarian organizations cannot justify the cost of
implementing high security measures for the distribution of their aid, often commodity foods.
The World Food Programme and other humanitarian organizations often face these problems to a
heightened degree while delivering food-aid to insecure areas. A long history of conflict between the
governments and various factions in the less secure regions of their countries creates an environment of
political instability and has left these regions neglected from government sponsored development and
growth. The high value of this aid in areas of humanitarian operation makes it target for theft, hijacking,
and looting. In less secure areas, inadequate infrastructure, a lack of reliable road data, and rebel
activity all impede the successful, secure delivery of aid.
In our thesis, we will explore and analyze the role that security plays in the World Food Programme's aid
distribution1 in the Somali region of Ethiopia. We will analyze the impact of risk in the WFP's
distribution system, study the current methods that the WFP employs to mitigate these risks, and
investigate possible precautionary tools to improve security in this resource constrained environment.
We will also examine the distribution methods of other non-commercial organizations in less-secure
1 The WFP uses the term "distribution" to refer to the dispersion of food to beneficiaries at the actual Final
Delivery Points (FDP). In our thesis, we use it in a broader supply chain sense.
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areas to make comparisons and further recommendations for the WFP. We hope that our research and
analysis will be applicable to not only the WFP, but also to other humanitarian organizations in similar
situations.
This introductory section will provide background information on the Somali region and the World Food
Programme (WFP), describe the WFP's current aid transportation methods both into and within the
Somali region, and discuss the approach we took to conduct our research.
1.1 BACKGROUND
Understanding the security concerns which motivate this thesis requires knowledge of both the Somali
geographic and political context and knowledge of the WFP's current operations in the region. Here we
provide a brief summary of the region and current operations and difficulties.
1.1.1 THE SOMALI REGION OF ETHIOPIA
The Somali region is the eastern most of nine regional states of the Federal Democratic Republic
Government of Ethiopia, bordering Djibouti, Kenya, and Somalia. Refer to Figure 1.1.
FIGURE 1.1: The location of the Somali region in Ethiopia
Source: CHF International, 2006
Although within Ethiopian boundaries, the Somali region is heavily influenced by its neighboring
country, Somalia. According to Ethiopia's Central Statistics Agency (2007), and as seen in Figure 1.2,
4,314,657 out of 4,439,147 total inhabitants of the Somali region (97.2%) are of Somali ethnicity.
Because of this overwhelming majority, the culture, forms of subsistence, and environment of the
Somali region more closely reflects the characteristics of Somalia than Ethiopia.
FIGURE 1.2: Ethnic Somali dispersion in the Horn of Africa
Source: University of Texas, 2009
1.1.1.1 History of the Ethio-Somali Conflict
Political instability has plagued the ethnically Somali region for many years. Since the late 1 9 th century,
the Somali region has passed back and forth through the hands of Ethiopia, Great Britain, and Italy. After
a century's worth of European colonial history, Britain returned control of the Somali region to Ethiopia
in the 1950s. However, because of Ethio-Somali ethnic tensions and a shortage of resources, political
insurgency began to break out heavily in the 1970s. Ethnic and governmental relations have not
improved much since then.
In the Somali region, insurgents and extremists threaten individuals' and communities' safety and
security. Armed insurgent rebel groups such as the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the
United Western Somali Liberation Front (UWSLF) as well as the prevalence of clans provide these
organized risks. For more information on these groups, look at Appendix A. These risks cause the
Somali region to remain unpredictable and volatile.
1.1.1.2 Food Insecurity in the Somali Region
The Somali region is poor and largely without access to electricity, potable drinking water, or successful
agriculture. The effect of unpredictable weather patterns, harvesting cycles, increased food costs, and
lifestyle factors contribute to the high level of food insecurity present in the region. Additionally, the
region's lack of government sponsored development and growth has increased its susceptibility to food
insecurity. These risks seriously hinder the ability for people to survive without food-aid from
humanitarian organizations such as the World Food Programme (WFP).
The Somali region is arid and typically gets affected harder than the rest of Ethiopia when a drought
occurs. Without much rain, livelihoods are lost, animals die, and watering holes dry up. Alternatively,
too much rain can also adversely affect the Somali region and floods do occur rarely. Not only are floods
dangerous for citizens, livestock, and crops, but floods can also wash away gravel and dirt roads, making
it difficult for aid to reach the affected areas.
The Somali region has multiple crop cycles and thus a few different harvest periods. However, they do
not overlap, creating a 3 month period between June and September that is considered to be a "hunger
period". Unfortunately, the increasing cost of food makes it difficult to supplement harvested food
during such hunger periods. Finally, the Somali region, primarily a pastoral region (Mohamed, 2001),
consists of many inhabitants who shift around to accommodate the changing seasons. This creates
challenges in the dynamics between different groups of people as well as with the ownership of land.
Further, aid organizations do find it difficult to reach moving populations.
1.1.1.3 Governance Indicators
The WorldBank (2008) defines Rule of Law as "the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide
by the rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as
well as the likelihood of crime and violence". Although the perceived Rule of Law in Ethiopia has
increased throughout the last decade, it still remains better than only 38% of the world's countries.
Comparatively, Somalia has the world's worst ranking for Rule of Law (refer to Figure 1.3). As discussed
earlier, the Somali region more closely resembles Somalia than Ethiopia. Therefore, it should come as
no surprise that inhabitants of the Somali region, much like Somalia, have little confidence in the
effectiveness of state law enforcement within the region.
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FIGURE 1.3: Comparison of the Rule of Law in Ethiopia and Somalia
Source: Adapted from WGI Project, 2008
An additional challenge in the Somali region involves controlling corruption (refer to Figure 1.4).
Defined as "the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain" (WorldBank, 2008),
corruption and insider involvement can include: drivers keeping rations for themselves or selling them
for a profit, drivers using aid or gasoline as a bribe to ward off threats such as the Ogaden National
Liberation Front (ONLF), or drivers working in conjunction with threats such as the ONLF. Although
Ethiopia is ranked better than 27.5% of countries analyzed, Somalia is again ranked the lowest in the
world, clarifying why the Somali region is susceptible to risky behavior.
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1.1.1.4 Somali Region Road Conditions
The poor infrastructure of the area reflects the impoverished economic and political state of Ethiopia
and its Somali region. This complicates organizations' efforts to provide aid in the region. According to
the World Health Organization (WHO), the roads in Ethiopia are "poorly maintained, inadequately
marked, and poorly lighted" (US State Department, 2008). While the WHO claims that daytime travel on
roads is generally safe, it also suggests that various historical and ongoing conflicts have left landmines
and other devices on remote dirt paths. Reuters (2007) describes the Somali region as less developed
than the rest of Ethiopia. Until 2006 the Somali region only had about 30 kilometers of tarmac road - all
of which was around Jijiga, the regional capital of the Somali region. 2
2 In recent years, the government increased infrastructure development and the percentage of paved road has
gone up. Though development is slow, an exact figure is unknown.
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1.1.2 THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (WFP) IN ETHIOPIA
The United Nations started the World Food Programme (WFP), its food-aid agency, in 1960. Currently,
the organization distributes aid to about 90 million people per year in more than 80 countries.
The WFP's operations vary by country. The WFP in Ethiopia is responsible for information management,
food movement, and aid distribution. In Ethiopia, the WFP supports four types of operations:
emergency, relief/rehabilitation, development, and special operations. As identified in Figure 1.5, we
will focus primarily on the Relief Component within the Protracted Relief and Rehabilitation Operation
(PRRO).
The WFP - Ethiopia
Emergency Protracted Relief and Development Operations Special Operations (SO)Operations(EMOP) Rehabilitation(PRRO) (DEV)
Pro s ediate Rebuilds after an emergency Improv Creates infastrctue
- Safety Net Component
Relief Component
I Targeted Supplementary
Food (TSF) Component
Urban HIV/AIDS
Component
FIGURE 1.5: The Organizational Structure of the World Food Programme's Operations in Ethiopia
Source: Adapted from wfp.org, 2009
The WFP distributes four particular bulk commodity items in the PRRO: cereals, pulses (leguminous
plants or their seeds), vegetable oil, and blended foods. The WFP distributes these through a series of
"hub and spoke" models.
1.1.2.1 Transportation of Aid in the Somali Region
The WFP aid process begins with the delivery of packaged and unpackaged bulk food to the port city of
Djibouti in the country of Djibouti. The WFP bags the unpackaged bulk products into consumer sized
rations in Djibouti and transports all the food to five Extended Delivery Points (EDPs) in Ethiopia. EDPs
are intermediary warehouses for the food-aid, strategically spread across the country to most efficiently
deliver aid to the beneficiaries at the hundreds of Final Destination Points (FDPs).
Previously, for the Somali region, the WFP would only deliver to the EDP at Dire Dawa. From here, the
Ethiopian Government, through its Disaster Management and Food Security Sector (DMFSS), took
responsibility for the delivery of aid to the FDPs, as seen below in Figure 1.6.
FIGURE 1.6: Previous distribution model for the Somali region
Source: WFP Ethiopia, 2009
When the Ethiopian government took control of the final delivery in the process, however, the WFP
could not determine what aid got delivered and to where. The government tracking of aid from this
point on did not always come back to the WFP properly, especially since the DMFSS would hand the aid
over to the Kebele, the smallest administrative unit in Ethiopia, and other 3 rd parties to distribute. This
aid would be delivered in 10 to 15-ton trucks, 4x4s, donkeys, or anything else available.
1.1.2.2 New Responsibilities for the WFP
In 2008, a reassessment of hunger needs by the Ethiopian government showed that demand had risen
from 4.6 million people to 6.4 million people. The demands in the Somali region alone had risen from
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1.5 million to 1.9 million people. Because the DMFSS was no longer able to cope with Somali region
food demands and accompanying security concerns by the fall of 2008, the Ethiopian Government
handed to the WFP the responsibility of aid delivery to the FDPs. Specifically, the Ethiopian government
further granted WFP the responsibility to deliver aid from the EDPs to the FDPs in the Somali region for
all relief efforts. In order to accommodate its newly expanded responsibilities, the WFP created
additional Extended Delivery Points (EDPs) to enter the Somali region. As seen in Figures 1.7 and 1.8,
these EDP locations now include Gode, Degehabur, Dire Dawa, Kebridehar, Nazreth, and Jijiga.
FIGURE 1.7: Extended Delivery Points used for distribution into the Somali Region
Source: WFP Ethiopia, 2009
The WFP plans to contract with local carriers to transport food aid from these new EDPs to the FDPs.
However, because of Somali region security concerns, there are a number of considerations the WFP
must address in order to successfully distribute food-aid within the region.
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FIGURE 1.8: The current distribution model for the Somali region
Source: WFP Ethiopia, 2009
Unfortunately, rebel forces in the Somali region have a history of taking over DMFSS-sponsored aid
vehicles. Therefore, most vehicles traveling in the region require military escort. Traveling with escorts
can significantly slow down the delivery process. The military will often wait for a certain number of
escort-requiring trucks before proceeding as a convoy, which take as long as a few weeks. Additionally,
the nature of a convoy restricts all vehicles from traveling any faster than the slowest truck in the group,
resulting in further delays.
1.1.2.3 Ensuring the Delivery of Aid in the Somali Region
Potential rebel take over, the escort process, poor road infrastructure and a lack of good quality trucks
slow down the aid process considerably. To most effectively deliver food to the FDPs, the WFP would
like to hire a dedicated fleet, a group of trucks owned by a third party but used only for WFP
commodities, and deliver aid in frequent and regular intervals. In order to accomplish this, the WFP
must improve and maintain excellent relations with the Ethiopian government and travel without
convoys. The WFP should further try to hire local Somali carriers to transport aid, as Somali region
inhabitants trust and will not target other ethnically Somali workers. Also, the WFP could potentially
implement tracking technologies, such as Global Positioning Systems (GPS), to convince the government
of the security of food-aid distribution. The WFP hopes that the data collected from these tracking
devices will increase knowledge of the road system and driving conditions. Further, the WFP hopes that
if the GPS devices can properly track these vehicles' progressions, then the government will allow these
WFP dedicated trucks to move through the Somali region without military escort, resulting in faster
delivery times.
1.2 APPROACH
In order to research the role of security in the WFP's operations, we closely studied three subjects:
1. Security-related issues that currently impact the WFP distribution environment
2. Current WFP risk mitigation methods
3. Potential technologies and tools to improve the security of distribution.
For each of these three categories, we employed both quantitative and qualitative methods, case
studies, interviews, and secondary literature research. By speaking with the WFP team on weekly
conference calls, we not only received data about their activities, but perfected our understanding of
their distribution system. In order to compare security measures across different organizations, we also
conducted several interviews with public, social, and humanitarian sector organizations, and discussions
with tracking technology gurus. Overall, however, data on and at humanitarian organizations is difficult
to find and procure. The organizations do not always have the resources to keep track or disseminate
this information. Therefore, our analysis is based on limited data.
To really understand the environment that the WFP operates in, we studied the impact of security on its
distribution system. In particular, we found that the impact of security on the escort system, on carrier
rates and relations, and on the aid losses that the WFP incurs to be unique to the humanitarian
environment. In order to accomplish this study, we interviewed the WFP extensively regarding all three
topics and also analyzed reports produced by the WFP's data collection tools. We analyzed maps, route
conditions, carrier rates, and loss data to quantify the atmosphere of the Somali region and also create
models and methods for further analysis.
In order to describe and analyze the WFP's current methods used to mitigate security risks, we studied
the organization's carrier contracting and engagement process, the Joint-Committee dispatch, and Food
Monitoring systems. We interviewed WFP Ethiopia thoroughly for all three subjects, but also analyzed
all carrier related documents in comparison with commercial sector documents.
Finally, in researching new, potential security methods and creating our recommendations for the WFP
and all humanitarian organizations, we conducted several interviews with different organizations and
researched literature on different technologies. This included interviews of many public, social, and
humanitarian sector organizations, discussions with tracking technology gurus, and research of articles
and cases about security implementation. We then used all of this research to analyze WFP-Ethiopia's
specific situation and recommend tools to enhance the security of aid distribution.
1.3 LITERATURE REVIEW
Supply chains worldwide are susceptible to security risks. Our thesis discusses some of the risks that
affect the Somali region and proposes some methods to mitigate those risks. Unfortunately, literature
regarding security risks in the humanitarian sector is sparse. Our thesis attempts to bridge the gap
between tactics and methods used in the private sector and those used in the humanitarian sector.
Our thesis is focused on security risks facing the World Food Programme (WFP) in the Somali region of
Ethiopia. Unfortunately, literature about the risk of distribution within the humanitarian sector is
limited. Therefore, we broadened our scope to include supply chain security from all sectors in order to
extract valuable lessons learned for the World Food Programme in Ethiopia and other humanitarian
organizations.
Falit and Fenton (2009) discussed the logistics of fleet management within Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs). Corruption within fleet management is fairly common within the humanitarian
sector but as Falit and Fenton (2009) point out, the amount of money spent wastefully on fleet
management is significantly higher than that lost to corruption. Falit and Fenton (2009) believe that
more adequate fleet management in NGOs will allow for better allocation of funds and cost savings that
can ultimately be passed along to its beneficiaries. In our thesis, we discuss how the WFP is currently
working towards improving fleet management through more effective carrier contracting and a better
understanding of carrier rates.
Anderson (2007) and Paul (2005) focused on the private sector; however, many of the consequences
from cargo theft are prevalent in the humanitarian sector as well. Paul (2005) reviewed seven best
practices to consider employing to enhance the security of a supply chain. The general premise of the
article was based on the old saying that "freight at rest is freight at risk". This article summarized
several of the most common and general security risks facing supply chains and the measures to take
against them. One of these risks, cargo theft, is a legitimate threat to any organization's supply chain.
Anderson (2007) examines the practice of cargo theft in today's economy where it is commonly seen in
the transportation of high-value products such as tobacco and electronics. Anderson (2007) discussed
the motives behind cargo theft as well as the process for the various ways in which theft can take place.
Additionally, he discussed Global Positioning Systems (GPS) as a preventative measure but made it clear
that "technology alone is not the magic bullet against cargo theft". Our thesis extends this literature
into the humanitarian sector as we discuss current risks facing the WFP as well as methods in which to
mitigate security risk, both technology-related and non-technology related.
2 IMPACT OF SECURITY RISKS ON WFP DISTRIBUTION 3
As identified in the introduction, travel into the Somali region can be a risky venture. Political, ethnic,
and financial tensions all play their part in making the Somali region a potentially dangerous area for
transportation and the real and perceived risks of the Somali region severely affect the WFP's
distribution. For example, with rebel activity and other security issues dotting the map of the Somali
region, the Ethiopian government insists that military escorts accompany many WFP-sponsored vehicles
in that area. However, this simple requirement by the government drastically affects the ways in which
the WFP distributes aid. The presence and need for escorts changes the frequency of deliveries, the
costs of transportation, and the perception of risk associated with the supply chain in the Somali region.
In this section, we will identify and quantify the unique characteristics of the environment that the WFP
and its partners operate in within the Somali region. First we will define and explore the role of the
military escorts in the WFP's distribution system. Next, we will briefly overview escorts' impact on the
frequency of deliveries and the need for unofficial storage at Final Delivery Points (FDPs). Third, we will
then analyze the affects of both security escorts and road conditions on the rates contracted carriers
charge the WFP. Finally, we will look at specific losses to understand the real threat facing WFP. By
doing this analysis, we can gain insight into how the WFP's environment affects the organization and,
more generally, how insecure environments affect distribution in humanitarian organizations.
3 As previously mentioned, the WFP uses the term "distribution" to refer to the dispersion of food to beneficiaries
at the actual Final Delivery Points (FDP). In our thesis, we use it in a broader supply chain sense.
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2.1 THE ROLE OF ESCORTS IN WFP DISTRIBUTION
The Ethiopian government insists that military escorts accompany all vehicles traveling on specific
routes south of Dire Dawa (Refer to Figure 1.6 to see the location of Dire Dawa). Each truck traveling on
these routes must wait at specified checkpoints until a military vehicle can escort it further. The
government requires this process not only to ensure the safety of vehicles and aid traveling into the
Somali region, but also to prevent potential undetected travel by insurgents and political rebels.
Because of this dual role of escorts, the government keeps the escort and convoy assignment process
rather private. Subsequently, the WFP, other organizations, and passenger vehicles have no true
understanding of how long they will need to wait once they have reached a checkpoint. The wait can
take several weeks and drivers are instructed to just wait in their trucks. Even after an escort does
arrive, it may wait for a convoy of WFP and other aid vehicles, which could be anywhere from 3 to 50
more trucks. Once the convoy departs, escorts will ride at the front and/or the back of the convoy. If a
truck breaks down in an unsecure area, the whole convoy will stop until it is fixed or until the
commodities are evenly distributed amongst the other vehicles. Additionally, the convoy's speed
depends wholly on the speed of the slowest vehicle in the group, often slowing down the trip two or
three times.
Because of these slowed travel times adversely affect WFP distribution (as seen in the subsequent
sections), the organization hopes to eventually convince the government to allow WFP-sponsored
vehicles to travel without escort into the Somali region. However, before doing so, the WFP must assess
the real risks that it ensues throughout the distribution process. While escorts restrict the ability for
organizations to move freely, it may eliminate threats that outweigh the costly adverse affects.
2.2 INADEQUATE STORAGE AND THE FREQUENCY OF DELIVERIES
The WFP delivers approximately 80 Metric Tons (MT) of food-aid per month to each of 212 FDPs in the
Somali region. However, instead of delivering as often as necessary, the organization's vehicles must
wait lengthy, unspecified times for escorts and/or convoys to arrive. This slowed traveling limits the
WFP to servicing an FDP once every month or two and therefore, it must send enough rations to fulfill
an FDP's entire monthly (or bi-monthly) needs. Such infrequent deliveries create an excess of inventory
that is not only difficult to store, but also might be diverted before reaching the beneficiaries.
In a perfect world, beneficiaries would receive their rations immediately. However, in reality, infrequent
deliveries cause difficulties in distribution since an entire month's worth of rations is often too difficult
to distribute right away. Consequently, beneficiaries must leave some food-aid behind in storage for
later pick up. In other words, infrequent deliveries result in larger lot sizes and thus, increase the cycle
stock. Unfortunately, because the WFP hands responsibility for the food back to the government once it
reaches the FDP, it does not have the control or resources to ensure proper storage or warehousing of
the food at the FDPs. Therefore, limited storage at the FDPs often results in unofficial town distributors,
who store and distribute the unpicked-up food from their homes. As "payment" for this position, the
town distributors may take a portion of the food aid, resulting in smaller rations or stockouts for
beneficiaries.
We have created a basic model to elaborate on the issue of frequency of delivery and unofficial
distributors, as seen in the table below. We know that WFP distributes to 212 FDPs in the Somali region
and that none of those locations have official storage areas. We also know that the WFP plans to
transport an average of 80 MT monthly to each FDP. Based on the examples of metric ton food volume
that we have seen, we assume that the community will distribute 30 MT immediately and store the
other 50 MT for ongoing pick up. We also assume that, on average, 25% of the aid stored in a
distributor's house might be kept as payment or sold for profit.
Step
A IFrequency of deliveries in one month 1
Calculation
Per Final Delivery Point (FDP)
B Monthly allocation of food-aid (MT) 80
C Food-aid distributed per delivery (MT) 80 = B /A
D Food-aid distributed immediately per delivery 30
E Inventory requiring storage per delivery 50 = C - D
F Inventory requiring storage per month 50 = E * A
G % of inventory kept as "payment" for storage 25%
H Amount of inventory kept as payment per month (MT) 13 = G * F
Per Entire Somali Region
I Number of Distribution Points in the Somali Region 212
J Total food-aid distributed per month (MT) 16960 = I *B
K Total food-aid used as storage "payment" per month (MT) 2650 =H * I
T=K/J
TABLE 2.1: The total percentage of food aid used as payment for unofficial storage -
monthly distribution
As seen in Table 2.1, this would result in an overall 16% loss of food. Of course, behavior in taking this
"payment" will change depending on location, amount of food, environment, etc. But for the purpose of
this model, we will assume the amount of "payment" taken as a constant percentage. Replenishing
food-aid more frequently would result in fewer storage requirements, if any, at the FDPs. In return, the
FDPs' unofficial storage needs would also decrease if the frequency of deliveries increased from the
current frequency of one per month. For instance, as seen in Table 2.2 below, the frequency of delivery
has been increased to two and four times a month. Since we assume that the same amount can always
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be distributed to the beneficiaries immediately (30MT per delivery), we can see that an increased
frequency of delivery would decrease or zero out the amount an unofficial town distributor might
retain.
Step
A IFrequency of deliveries in one month 1 2 4
Calculation
Per Final Delivery Point (FDP)
B Monthly allocation of food-aid (MT) 80 80 80
C Food-aid distributed per delivery (MT) 80 40 20 = B/A
D Food-aid distributed immediately per delivery 30 30 30
E Inventory requiring storage per delivery 50 10 0 = C- D
F Inventory requiring storage per month 50 20 0 = E * A
G % of inventory kept as "payment" for storage 25% 25% 25%
H Amount of inventory kept as payment per month (MT) 13 5 0 = G * F
Per Entire Somali Region
I Number of Distribution Points in the Somali Region 212 212 212
J Total food-aid distributed per month (MT) 16960 16960 16960 = I *B
K Total food-aid used as storage "payment" per month (MT) 2650 1060 0 = H * I
TABLE 2.2: The percentage of food aid used as payment for unofficial storage -
Variable frequency of distribution
Although the overall coordination of escorts and the WFP has improved recently (as specified in the next
chapter), the improvement comes only with more consistent monthly deliveries. If the WFP could
deliver rations more frequently in biweekly or weekly shipments, additional flexibility would be built into
current operations by allowing shipments to be dispatched as needed rather than in one bulk shipment.
Although weekly shipments sound more frequent than necessary, they may not impact transportation
costs as one might expect. The WFP currently uses various sized trucks, one of the largest of which is
20MT. There is no cost difference in transporting 80MT to an FDP through one truck delivering aid four
times per month or four trucks delivering food-aid all at once.
As mentioned, the WFP is not responsible for distribution at FDPs or tracking demand and service level.
However, on a more general level, with more frequent deliveries, humanitarian organizations could
better understand true consumption. More frequent deliveries would not only allow an organization to
gather data and react accordingly regularly, but would also decrease the necessity for informal storage
sites, helping to improve the overall efficiency of the aid distribution process.
2.3 SECURITY IMPACT ON CARRIER RATES
The frequency at which distribution takes place not only impacts the beneficiaries, but also the carriers
transporting the aid. The WFP contracts with local carriers to physically transport food-aid into the
Somali area. We can assume that the carrier rates charged reflect both the high risks that these
contracted carriers face in transporting goods into the region and the slowed travel time that those risks
cause. Unfortunately, the financial cost of this security impact is unknown.
We would like to understand the risk that WFP contracted carriers take on and how that risk affects
WFP operations and cost. In this section, we would like to quantify and understand the risk that WFP
and its contracted carriers face while traveling into the Somali region. To do this, we will identify the
least secure routes and how road conditions and security are tied together.
2.3.1 METHODOLOGY USED TO ANALYZE CARRIER RATES
In order to learn more about the circumstances in which the WFP operates, we acquired and analyzed
three data sets from the WFP. We then drew conclusions on WFP's environment and its affect on
distribution by measuring the road and security conditions and their impacts on cost. Finally, to
determine the extent to which variables affected carrier rates, we performed a multiple regression to
identify the variables with the greatest impact on cost.
2.3.2 DATA SETS
The WFP provided us with three distinct sets of data to understand individual routes' rates, road
conditions, and security levels. The first two data sets listed characteristics for a specific route (a
warehouse origin and Final Destination Point pair). Each data set is explained below.
* Roads data: This data set provides us with routes between warehouse origins to the final
destination point and the corresponding distance, travel time, and road type. The road type
information provides us with the number of meters of each route that is paved, the number of
meters that is gravel, and the number of meters of dirt/other.
* Rates data: This data set provides us with the rates charged by different carriers for routes
between warehouses origins and final destination points. A route may have several carrier rate
entries if that route has rate quotes from multiple carriers. These rates are in the units of
$/Metric Ton 4.
4 We did not receive data for the EDP of Kebridehar and have therefore left it out of our analysis.
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* Security data: The WFP provided us with a map that indicated military escort requirements for
different main routes through a color-coding scheme. A red colored path indicated a path that
required escort, green color indicated a secure path (no escort necessary), and yellow color
indicated that the route requires observation. Refer to Figure 3.1 for a sample map.
We first merged the Roads data with the Rates data according to route. With this new, consolidated
data set, we could view the rates charged by different carriers, drive times, distances, and road
conditions for every route.
Using this data, we created a road conditions scoring system from zero to two based on the route's
percentage of pavement, gravel, or dirt/other. Generally speaking, gravel and dirt roads slow the speed
at which vehicles can travel. Additionally, gravel and dirt roads, often found in more rural areas with
less traffic, expose vehicles to greater security risks more than crowded, paved roads. A higher score
reflected a larger proportion of gravel and dirt driving surfaces, and thus a higher security risk. We
awarded points proportionally to the amount of each surface type along a certain route then compared
the scores for each route to understand the road condition of that route. Points were awarded as
follows:
Road risk score = (% pavement * 0 points) + (% gravel * 1 point) + (% dirt/other * 2 points)
For example, according to Table 2.3 below, the route between Degehabur and FDP C received a road risk
score of 2.00 whereas the route from Degehabur to FDP F received a score of .23. The route between
Degehabur and FDP C consisted of 100% dirt or other surfaces and therefore received a score of 2
points:
100% * 2 = 2 points
The path between Degehabur and FDP F consisted of 78% paved, 20% gravel, and 2% dirt or gravel and
received a score of .23 points:
(78% * 0 points) + (20% * 1 point) + (2% * 2 points) = .23 Points
Paved Gravel D r Paved Gravel Dirt/OtherPaved Gravel Dirt/OtherWarehouse FDP Score Score ScoreSurface (m) Surface (m) Surface (m) (Opts) (I Pt) (2pts)
Degehabur FDP C 0.00 0.00 75723.00 0.00 0.00 2.00
Degehabur FDP F 221766.01 57974.95 4355.67 0.00 0.20 0.03
TABLE 2.3: Sample data used to calculate road risk
Finally, we calculated the escort risk for each route. We merged the Security data set into the data set
containing both the Roads data and Rates data. Since the map only identified major routes, we
identified the escort risk level through the main routes only. To quantify the security threat level as it
related to escorts, we proportionally assigned roads marked in red with a score of 2, yellow with a score
of 1, and green with a score of 0. Similarly to the method used to calculate road risk, overall security risk
ranged from zero to two as well.
Escort risk score = (% green * 0 points) + (% yellow * 1 point) + (% red * 2 points)
Figure 2.1 is an example of the map the WFP provided us with. It is important to note that these routes
and FDPs are completely fictitious and simply demonstrate the method with which we calculated the
escort risk for the more sensitive WFP data.
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FIGURE 2.1: Sample map used to determine escort risk level for each route in the Somali regions
Source: Adapted from WFP Ethiopia, 2009
According to Table 2.4, the route between Dire Dawa and FDP A received a security risk score of 0:
(100% green * 0 points) + (0% yellow * 1 point) + (0% red * 2 points) = 0 points
In comparison, the path between Jijiga and FDP B consisted of 50% green paths and 50% red paths,
resulting in an escort risk of 1 point:
(50% green * 0 points) + ( 0% yellow * 1 point) + (50% red * 2 points) = 1 point
5 We have falsified the routes indicated on the map to disguise the data provided by the WFP.
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Finally, despite the fact that the route between Gode and FDP C consisted equally of green, yellow, and
red paths, the resulting escort risk was also 1; the same score received by the route between Jijiga and
FDP B:
(33.3% green * 0 points) + (33.3% yellow * 1 point) + (33.3% red * 2 points) = 1 point
Warehouse FDP Green (Opt) Yellow (1 pt) Red (2pts
Dire Dawa FDP A 1 0 0
Jijiga FDP B 0.5 0 0.5
Gode FDP C 0.33 0.33 0.33
TABLE 2.4: Sample data used to calculate escort risk
From the two basic calculations of road risk and escort risk, we could now see the rates, distances, time,
road quality, and security data for each individual route in the Somali region. To view data tables see
Appendix C.
2.3.3 ANALYSIS OF ROAD RISK AND ESCORT RISK ON COST
After compiling all data onto one spreadsheet, we began the process of analyzing individual
characteristics' affect on carrier rates. This analysis simply tested our hypothesis that unfavorable route
characteristics (poor road condition or the need for an escort) increase the rate that a carrier charges for
that route.
FIGURE 2.2: The effect of road risk on the cost of distribution
Carrier rates do not just reflect road risk but also the road conditions themselves. Poor road conditions
can increase cost through the need for additional maintenance and longer travel times. As expected, we
noticed that as the road risk score increases, the rate charged by the carrier increases as well. Figure 2.2
displays the positive trend seen in the relationship between road risk score and cost per kilometer.
Similarly, a positive trend appears when comparing escort risk to the cost per kilometer. As seen in
Figure 2.3, a large number of routes received extreme scores of 0 (no escort risk) and 2 (maximum
escort risk). Although the ranges for cost vary widely, a positive trend shows that overall, the cost
increases as the escort risk increases.
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FIGURE 2.3: The effect of escort risk on the cost of transportation
Additionally, as expected, the rate per is lowest when road conditions are best - when more than one
third of the route is paved - and highest when road conditions are worst - when more than one third of
the route is dirt or other undesirable materials. Refer to Figure 2.4 below.
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FIGURE 2.4: The effect of road type on cost
Accordingly, Figure 2.5 demonstrates that the data also shows that for the most part, the highest rates
are for the slowest routes, and that the rates decrease as the driving speed of the routes increase. In
performing this analysis, we identified two paved, fast moving anomalies that threw off the trend
towards the 55 km/hr and 60 km/hr marks. The WFP is further investigating these anomalies.
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FIGURE 2.5: The effect of average traveling speed on cost
Finally, the average rate per km increases by almost 50% for routes that require an escort. Figure 2.6
reflects the indication that security risks do indeed have a heavy impact on the price of transportation.
This is contrary to what one might expect since many carriers would charge a premium for routes
without an escort, since risk is inherently higher. However, with such lengthy and unpredictable wait
times for escorts in the Somali region, carriers try to hedge against periods of wasted time by charging
higher rates for routes requiring escorts.
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FIGURE 2.6: The effect of escort requirements on cost
As mentioned, security risks create the need for escorts, which in turn affects the speed at which
vehicles can travel. The longer the vehicle is en route, whether due to travel speed or distance, the
higher the vehicle becomes susceptible to security risks. Figure 2.7 compares road risk to escort risk.
From this, we can see that a correlation does exist between the need for escorts and the road condition.
As the escort risk increases, the road risk increases. In fact, each route requiring an escort (escort risk
>0), has some degree of road risk. Contrarily, routes with road risk do not necessarily require an escort.
This is due to the fact that the Ethiopian Government deems many roads to be secure, regardless of
road condition. However, for the most part, as road conditions worsen, escort needs increase. This tells
us that poor road conditions may pose a security risk. This makes sense, of course, given not only the
argument above, but also the mentioned possibility of landmines on rural paths, and general vehicular
damage on poor quality roads.
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FIGURE 2.7: Comparison of road risk to escort risk
In order to assess the full security threat, we added the two point road risk score and the two point
escort risk score together and created an overall security threat score, based on a zero to four scale,
with zero being a non-security risk route and four being a full security risk route. (Refer to Figure 2.8).
This method assumes that the need for escorts weighs as heavily as road conditions in a carrier's
assessment of a route's security risk.
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FIGURE 2.8: The effect of overall security risk on cost of distribution
Figure 2.8 shows that the coefficient of determination increases when both escort risk and road risks are
taken into consideration (0.2535) and suggests that looking at both type of risk creates a better
approach to categorize risk as a predictor of carrier rates.
2.3.4 VARIANCE IN THE COST OF TRANSPORTATION - MULTIPLE REGRESSION
From previous sections, we have seen how security risks affect the cost of transportation in the Somali
region. To understand the relationship between the price of transportation for a specific route and the
security of that route, we used a multiple regression technique. The purpose of a regression is to model
and predict a dependent variable based on a number of independent variables. In this case, the
dependent variable is the price of transportation and the model will help us predict the behavior of the
price based on observations of independent variables including road risk, escort risk, and driving time.
After several iterations, the final form of our regression is:
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Price =f (road risk, escort risk, driving time)
y: = o + Pxt + #zxz + l3X3 E
Where:
yi = the cost of transportation
1o = the baseline
13 =coefficient for road risk
32 = coefficient for escort risk
13 = coefficient for driving time
E = noise
xl = road risk score (0-2)
x2 = escort risk score (0-2)
x3= driving time (hrs)
The y-intercept (3o) serves as the baseline for the model. This means that all routes have an initial cost
of 13 and then increase or decrease depending upon the other variables (P131 3x1 3). Each variable must
also have a baseline, or default, value. For continuous variables such as road risk, escort risk, and driving
time, the baseline is 0. A route with a road risk of 2 will therefore alter the baseline price of
transportation.
The regression model produced a coefficient of determination of .646, meaning that 64.6% of the
variation in price can be explained by the road risk, escort risk, and driving time. The higher the
coefficient of determination, the more accurately the model can be used to predict future outcomes.
Table 2.5 shows some selected results from the regression model.
Multiplythe
coefficient by the c
variable and add it
to the baseline
Variable Coefficient in ($)
Y-intercept 4.376
Road Risk 2.889
Escort Risk 1.037
Driving Time -0.3884
Variables are
)nsidered statistically
gnificant if this is less
than 0.05
P-Value
1.01 E-52
1.51 E-37
3.99E-12
8.02E-56
The coefficient falls
between the lower
and upper bounds
95% of the time
95% Lower 95% Upper
3.9098 4.8431
2.4994 3.2786
0.7541 1.3207
-0.4281 -0.3487
TABLE 2.5: Results from the multiple regression
Recall the equation seen earlier:
Price = f (road risk, escort risk, driving time)
Y1 = fo + ixi + 2 xz + P 3X 3 f
Given the results from the regression, we can use this equation to predict future prices as long as we
know the road risk, escort risk, expected driving time, origin, and destination. Let's assume we have a
route with the following parameters:
road risk escort risk driving time
2 1 3 hrs
Y1=4.376 + 2.889(2) + 1.037(1) -0.3884(3) 4 Y1= 10.03($/MT/km)
Using the model we can predict that a route with those parameters would have a rate of $10.03 per
Metric ton per kilometer. Although this model may prove useful in predicting or verifying proposed
costs for transportation, it has much room for improvement. Ideally, we would have added origin and
destination into the equation. We did, in fact, attempt to add variables into the equation for origin and
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destination, and in doing so, received a much higher coefficient of determination (.875). However,
Microsoft Excel limited us to a maximum of 16 variables and in order to account for each of the origins
(warehouses) and destinations (FDPs), we would have required a system capable of incorporating 55
additional binary variables. Additionally, we only had 333 observations; more data would be necessary
to perform such a robust regression from which to draw strong conclusions. Therefore, we chose to
base the variation in carrier costs on the three variables (road risk, escort risk, and driving time) from
our original regression.
The individual variable which impacted the coefficient of determination the most significantly was the
driving time. The driving time was presented to us as an independent variable based upon data from
past trips. However, realistically, both escort risk and road risk contribute to variation in driving time
and may in fact correlate to driving time. Any correlation amongst independent variables such as driving
time, road risk, and escort risk can lead to multi co-linearity, a condition in which independent variables
are dependent on other independent variables, much like a circular reference. To ensure the greatest
level of accuracy, further statistical tests should be conducted to avoid multi co-linearity. However,
given the depth of data available, we were unable to conduct further statistical tests.
2.3.5 REMARKS ON SECURITY'S EFFECT ON CARRIER RATES
The results of this data show us a few important things. Firstly, as we have seen, escorts bring serious
cost impacts on route rates, likely as less secure paths require escorts and escorts cause longer waiting
times. These wait times create an uncertainty for carrier drivers. Secondly, road conditions are
correlated with security. Not only do poor road conditions cause high prices, but these conditions exist
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on routes with security and escort threats. Thirdly, understanding route characteristics about security
such as road risk, escort risk, driving time, origin, and destination explain 87.5% of the variation on the
price of transportation. Although it is likely that additional variables affect the cost as well, it is clear
that the variables most closely related to security have the greatest impact on cost.
2.4 LOSS DATA
So far, we have defined WFP operations in an environment where serious security threats occur
consistently. Unfortunately, we have little data to explore the actual incidents creating this
environment of risk. During 2008, the WFP made 5,136 deliveries and only reported nine incidents of
hijackings and thefts to the authorities, resulting in only a 211.5 MT food-aid loss. However, while the
number of incidents does not seem to indicate much, we can learn much about the background in which
the WFP operates.
2.4.1 Loss DATA ANALYSIS
The WFP data provided us with the details of 9 incidents of loss. This data contains the name of the
destination district, the amount of food lost, and a description of the event. We merged this data with
the analysis from the previous section, allowing us to see the road and security scores for each incident.
We had to eliminate two of the data points since we did not have enough information about the route
traveled during distribution. We have placed the data below in Table 2.6 with changed destination
names.
Allocation Losses in Escort Risk Road Risk Overall security
Month MT (0-2) (0-2) risk (0-4)
Railway wagons that were left behind
due to technical issues were looted by
locals despite being guarded by 32 W May 60 0 0.525 0.525
railway Policemen. This is linked to
food shortage as the local population is
not considered to be banditry.
Dispatched from EDP outside of Somali2 MM June 40.5 1.333 1.46 2.79
Region.
District officials complained that town
FDP rations were not delivered despite
the fact that other food deliveries were
2 FF June 24.304 completed as scheduled. District 1.33 0.693 2.026
officials reportedly saw a broken down
vehicle around the FDP that was not
seen again later.
Railway wagons that were left behind
due to technical issues were looted by
locals despite being guarded by 42 W July 60 0.525 0 0.525
railway Policemen. This is linked to
food shortage as the local population is
not considered to be banditry.
Reported by officials. Food was
1 FF August 2.1 retrieved, legal action was taken & 0 0.235 0.235
food was distributed to beneficiaries.
The truck was stuck in a mud when it2 W October 20.2 0 0.525 0.525
was looted by a local community.
The driver was misguided by members 0 0.065
of local community.
2 U October 2.4528 Looted by a local community 0 1.077 1.077
Two trucks were looted by armed
villagers while 11 trucks were trying to
cross the river near their village. Then
the armed-men instructed the4 BB December ? 1.33 0.69 2.024
remaining 9 trucks to park in the
village. The 9 trucks were later released
with no casualty. The incident is linked
to shortage of food in the area.
TABLE 2.6: Masked loss data from 2008 for the Somali region
Source: WFP Ethiopia, 2008
2.4.2 LOOTING CHARACTERISTICS
At first glance, the amount of food lost last year (211.5 MT) seems inconsequential compared to the
total amount of aid that the WFP distributes to the Somali region (an average of 80 MT/month for 212
FDPs is 203,520 MT per year); less than 0.1% of the goods are lost per year.
As most of these incidents occur in "secure areas", we might assume that the data correlates poorly to
the perceived threat of the region. However, because the military requires escort services on roads
considered medium and high security risks, this could mean that hijackings and lootings can now only
occur in the absence of military protection. Without military escort, the looting parties might feel more
powerful against guards and truck drivers. Though escorts create significantly slower traveling times,
perhaps their presence does defend the WFP's food aid in a considerable manner. Figure 3.9 displays
each of the nine incidents' overall security risks.
4
0 35
W 3
0o 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Incident #
FIGURE 2.9: 2008 incidents of Loss and their overall security risks
According to the commentaries accompanying each entry, two-thirds of the incidents occurred in the
presence of truck drivers or railway guards. The other incidents may have also transpired similarly, but
their entries simply did not specify the circumstances around the looting. This information leads us to
believe that these events, though few in number, do indeed signify an environment full of danger.
As mentioned previously, we assume that vehicles that travel on dirt and gravel roads might have a
higher theft frequency, as they travel at slower susceptible paces. However, from this data, we cannot
tell on which part of the road that this event occurred and therefore, we cannot see if that pattern
persists.
2.4.3 INCIDENT REPORTING
Due to the nature of the political instability, food insecurity, and overall tension in the region, one might
assume that the Somali region would have more than nine instances of aid lost in 2008. A low number
of incidents could also mean that the WFP sponsored truck drivers, beneficiary communities, or
warehousing workers fail to report incidents to authorities. This could be for any number of reasons
including lack of trust in law enforcement, bribery, or insider involvement. As previously mentioned in
Chapter 1.1.1.3, the Somali region has low Rule of Law and corruption measures. In that case, of course,
insider involvement will not be reported to the authorities and there may also be additional backlash on
communities if they do report any unusual behavior. Additionally, those responsible for theft may bribe
witnesses with some of the stolen goods to remain quiet. Therefore it is plausible that drivers might
keep rations for themselves or selling them for a profit, use aid or gasoline as a bribe to ward off threats
from rebel groups, or even drivers working in conjunction with those groups - all without fear of
consequences.
Finally, lootings in these particular regions may occur so rarely that when they happen, people report
them. It is possible that theft, robbery, and hijacking are so common in other districts that they are no
longer reported each time they happen, as per low Rule of Law.
2.5 CONCLUSION
Political, ethnic, agricultural, and financial tensions define the security of the Somali region.
Unfortunately, the perceived risk that accompanies these tensions severely limits the distribution supply
chain of the WFP in the Somali area. That perceived risk translates into the need for escorts, heavily
slowed transit times, food storage issues, and increased carrier rates. As seen in the last section,
sometimes the security threat directly impinges on the safety and health of WFP-sponsored truck
drivers and beneficiaries.
While the WFP understood that the stability of the region takes a toll on their operations, the
organization had not previously quantified it or assessed it in depth. However, with this data analysis, it
may reassess the value of escorts for protection, try to re-negotiate the frequency with which it delivers
food, or bargain with carriers to lower rates.
Humanitarian organizations should work to understand the affect of security on their distributions and
operations. It is with this quantification that they may be able to collaborate with the parties around
them to enhance their quality of work.
3 WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME SECURITY ACTIVITIES
The aid distributed by the WFP passes through the hands of several parties and individuals before
reaching the actual beneficiaries. The government, private carriers, and beneficiary community leaders
all have a profound influence on the success of the WFP's distribution system. Their actions determine
the amount, frequency, and consumption of aid that reaches the people of the Somali region. By
involving these parties in the planning and assessment process, the WFP takes an active role in ensuring
the security of its aid and beneficiaries. In this section, we will examine the activities in which the WFP
engages to secure its aid distribution in the insecure Somali region. Specifically, we will look at how the
WFP engages with carriers through a contracting process, with the government through Joint
Committees, and with beneficiaries through Food Monitors. All three of these processes not only set
strict guidelines meant to secure goods, but also create relationships of trust and responsibility within
the WFP communities.
3.1 CARRIER CONTRACTING
Generally, organizations contract with carriers to transport their products. In the case of the WFP and
some other humanitarian organizations, this product is food-aid. While the carrier and the consignor
almost always engage in some contract process to ensure the safe transport of goods, the WFP's
specialized process takes into account the perceived risk of its environment. By engaging and
contracting carefully and uniquely with carriers, the WFP takes the first step in securing its distribution
system in the Somali region.
To analyze WFP's carrier engagement process, we compared the carrier documentation of the WFP and
a commercial sector organization in a stable environment. The WFP Requests for Quotation (RFQ) can
be found in Appendix B. In this section we will first review the steps that the WFP takes to mitigate risk
in the overall carrier engagement process. Next we will identify the contractual clauses that the WFP
uses to account for unique security threats.
3.1.1 ENGAGEMENT PROCESS
Generally, the WFP and the commercial sector engage local carriers similarly. The WFP first sends out
questionnaires asking for carrier companies' profiles, bank accounts, and financial statements. Second,
the WFP sends out RFQs to carriers whose questionnaire profiles match their standards. Unlike the
commercial sector, the WFP does not use an actual contract, but relies solely on an RFQ. After this step,
carriers receive Loading Orders and carriers and beneficiary community representatives sign paper
Waybills to track aid shipments. In the case that carriers do not perform up to the standards stipulated
by the RFQ, the WFP will blacklist them.
Private carriers, however, hesitate to sign on for the WFP job. The instability of the area as well as the
long, empty backhauls means lost efficiencies, wages, and security for the company. This hesitation
causes the WFP, unlike commercial organizations, to engage with local carriers in a more informal
manner, allowing carriers the option to leave the mutual contract.
However, at the same time, because the food-aid that the WFP distributes fuels the lives of those in the
Somali region, the WFP must take great care in choosing carriers. Especially while looking for a
dedicated fleet or a permanent relationship, the WFP must look for carriers with good reputations and
financial backings. Further, the WFP finds few carrier companies that both match their standards and
are willing to dedicate fleet to travel within the Somali region. Because of this, the WFP does not pay as
much attention to cost as organizations in the commercial sector might. The WFP cannot concern itself
with finding the cheapest carriers, as it must concentrate on finding the few qualified, dedicated, and
willing carriers.
3.1.2 CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES
Once the WFP does find qualified, dedicated, and willing carriers, it must communicate emphatically the
importance of the security of its goods and beneficiaries. The RFQ in Appendix B, written by the WFP,
has many stipulations with high security implications, much like a contract. To assess the clauses driven
by the WFP's unique security situation, we compared the WFP documents with commercial sector
contract for dedicated fleets. We find that, unlike commercial contracts, the WFP RFQ urges carriers to
take full responsibility, insists on full communication during a security breakdown, and sets guidelines
for beneficiary interaction.
Firstly, the RFQ specifies several times that the carrier assumes full responsibility for the safety of the
cargo. Accordingly, the WFP has a no tolerance policy for leakage or spillage of goods, defined as any
"shortage in weight" of goods at destination.
The contractor shall assume full responsibility for the cargo (quantity, condition and integrity) whilst
in his custody or that of his employees, agents or subcontractors (RFQ 8.1, 2008)
Leakage and/ or spillage shall not be tolerated and shall be considered as losses (missing quantities).
For the purpose of this RfQ leakage or spillage is defined as a shortage in weight of units at
destination compared with the weight of units as declared on the waybill and signed at the point of
origin where the contractor took over the responsibility over the commodities. (RFQ 8.2, 2008)
Unlike the commercial contracts that we analyzed, this RFQ anticipates the possibility of fraud, theft,
and corruption at a heightened level. In the WFP RFQ, legal measures written to secure distribution may
also propel a heightened sense of responsibility upon the driver. However, this sense of responsibility
might be an attitude that the WFP intentionally tries to spread. If the attitude reflected in the contract
trickles down to individual drivers, it may instill in them the responsibility to defend the cargo that they
carry. It may deter drivers from taking part in insider scams, assisting rebel groups, or leaving their
trucks un-manned.
Secondly, the WFP demands full communication in the case of a security issue. In Section 7.3, the RFQ
specifies that the carriers must adhere to Prompt and comprehensive reporting and Continuous feedback
in case of breakdown, accident or security incident. Further, the RFQ stipulates:
In addition, the Contractor shall assume full responsibility for any fraudulent and/or illegal acts it
commits knowingly or unknowingly and WFP shall be exempt from any liability whatsoever in this
respect. (RFQ 11, 2008)
In comparison to commercial contracts, the WFP RFQ exhibits not only an awareness of a looming
security threat, but also an expectation. Because of this, the WFP sets up performance guidelines for
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those security related situations. In this case, the WFP, unlike a commercial organization, demands that
the carrier ensures ongoing communication even during a threatening situation.
Thirdly, and most importantly, the WFP RFQ demands respect and security for its beneficiaries in
addition to its food-aid cargo. The RFQ specifies not only the responsibility of the carrier to abstain from
fraudulent and illegal activities, but also the protection agreement of the UN to the people that the WFP
serves. The RFQ demands that all carriers and contractors act according to the highest standards of
protection. Further, to avoid the sexual abuse and exploitation of beneficiaries, the document prohibits
carriers from spending the night at beneficiary camps.
The United Nations and WFP are committed to the protection of vulnerable populations in
humanitarian crisis, including from sexual exploitation or abuse. By entering into an agreement with
WFP, the Contractor undertakes to adhere to the standard of conduct established to this effect by
the United Nations and to ensure that its personnel conforms to the highest standards of moral and
ethical conduct. Any failure by the Contractor to take preventive measures against sexual
exploitation or abuse, to investigate allegations thereof or to take corrective action, shall constitute
grounds for termination of the agreement.
Contractor employees are prohibited from staying overnight at a beneficiary camp. (RFQ 16, 2008)
Commercial contracts may demand that cargo reach the end-customer in satisfactory condition.
However, while commercial organizations hope for the satisfaction of their customers, they do not
stipulate this satisfaction within the bounds of a carrier contract. For the WFP and other humanitarian
organizations, beneficiaries are the end-user. The organizations' businesses focus solely on maintaining
the lives of those living in instability.
3.2 JOINT COMMITTEES
In the fall of 2008, the World Food Programme (WFP) began to lead the secondary transport of food-aid
within Ethiopia to the Somali region. In order to increase collaborative efforts, the World Food
Programme and the Ethiopian government have set up two Joint Committee groups. The first group,
composed of WFP and the Disaster Management and Food Security Sector (DMFSS) members and
located in Addis Ababa, oversees the entirety of the food intervention in the Somali region. The second,
more unique group, composed of the WFP, the military, and government workers, decentralizes the
dispatch and escort decisions and increases cooperation at local levels on the ground. Now, instead of
solely making decisions for transportation throughout Ethiopia from the capital city of Addis Ababa, the
committee members will jointly decide dispatches from Gode, Dire Dawa, Jijiga, Kebridehar, and
Degehabor, the EDPs serving the Somali region. (Refer to Map 1.7).
This second, localized Joint Committee meets in each of the ground locations once a week. Each weekly
meeting, co-chaired by DMFSS and WFP, requires representation from the three member groups stated
above. A head of a sub-office or head of logistics from the WFP must also attend. Additionally, mayors
or zonal administrators are also invited to join the meetings and, in some areas, play a very critical role
within the committee. Together, the committee will make decisions regarding the routes, the food-aid
content, and whether moving is plausible at all. Each decision requires buy-in from each of the three
represented arms.
This Joint Committee has two tangible benefits. Because of their now local, joint dispatching efforts, the
military is more aware of the WFP's escort needs and therefore can more accurately predict WFP
deliveries. Further, because the WFP and the military work together to schedule these deliveries from
the ground, the military can send WFP sponsored vehicles just with escorts instead of waiting for full
convoys at Dire Dawa. Subsequently, they can deliver aid more frequently. For instance, in the past,
only 20% of delivery points were being reached each month. However, due to the increased frequency
of military escorts, 70%-80% of distribution points are now successfully receiving deliveries. Since the
dispatches are local, the drivers are also locals, instead of Ethio-ethnic highlanders. Highlanders are
often mistrusted in the politically rebellious Somali region, and therefore, transportation security
increases with the addition of local drivers.
3.3 FOOD MONITORING
In order to secure distribution at the FDP, the WFP sends official Food Monitors into the field. These
Food Monitors verify the distribution of beneficiary aid as often as possible in selected locations, given
the limited resources. The FDP selection process is semi-random but prioritizes problematic FDPs. Each
EDP office dispatches food monitors and decides on the prioritization of its food monitoring programs.
For example, if the WFP recognizes an FDP as especially inefficient or corrupt, it will send a Monitor
there instead of a smoothly running FDP. Food Monitors report back to the country office weekly and
the country office compiles those reports and sends them back to headquarters.
Like any WFP staff member, these Food Monitors must receive security clearance from the United
Nations Department of Safety and Security in Addis Ababa. However, unlike most of the WFP staff
members, Food Monitors are locals and therefore have more flexibility in terms of movement. The Food
Monitors can go anywhere in the country, whereas the WFP restricts international staff members from
traveling to areas without a significant military presence. Further, by hiring local staff for this position,
the WFP has enhanced its ability to communicate directly with beneficiaries. These Food Monitors,
often ethnically Somali, can communicate with beneficiaries and often interview beneficiaries to find the
quality and reliability of the aid service. This practice further secures the distribution of aid but now at
the beneficiary level.
The WFP hires Food Monitors to ensure the safety of its aid. However, the WFP has also created policies
to ensure the safety of its Food Monitors. The WFP has a policy to not deliver food if a Food Monitor
cannot access the area. However, in practice, because security restrictions can change rapidly, food will
sometimes continue to travel into an area that a Food Monitor can no longer go. This inhibits the WFP's
ability to monitor an area and may prevent that area from receiving aid until it is deemed safe.
3.4 CONCLUSION
The WFP and all humanitarian organizations operating in insecure areas rely on other parties and
individuals to safely distribute aid. In this particular case, the WFP relies on the government and its
military escorts, private carriers and their drivers, and its own Food Monitors and the beneficiaries that
they interact with. Escort drivers, carrier drivers, and food monitors are not just simple contracted
employees, but significant security guarantors. For this reason, to best ensure the safety of its aid, the
WFP must treat each individual in its aid supply chain of its aid with respect and trust.
Further, the WFP must engage all participating parties and individuals in the planning and monitoring
process. With closer ties to government, the organization raised its delivery efficiency by 60%. By
specifying risks and security clauses, the WFP truthfully outlines the environment and expectations to
contracted carriers. These actions create unions in which both parties have vested interest in the best
security for the aid and the beneficiaries.
More generally speaking, to ensure the safety of aid, the WFP and other humanitarian organizations
must reach out to all stakeholders to create the relationships that foster trust. With trust between
organizations and the home government, carriers, beneficiaries, and ethnic groups, different parties and
individuals will be less likely to blatantly disrupt the distribution process. Further, the relationship
between humanitarian organizations and the government is crucial. The relationship should be
synergistic so that the organization can not only receive assistance from the government, but can lift up
and champion the methods of the government when appropriate.
4 POTENTIAL AND RECOMMENDED SECURITY MEASURES
Recently, the WFP- Ethiopia has decided to follow the lead of several other commercial and
humanitarian organizations and look into the use of Global Positioning System (GPS) technologies to
enhance its distribution security. Technology is becoming a popular method through which
organizations monitor their supply chains. In this section we will analyze the features, benefits, and risks
of this and other tracking technologies for humanitarian organizations using literature, interviews, and
case-based research. Further, we will analyze non-technology methods and approaches that enhance
and ensure secure and successful aid delivery. Finally, we will make recommendations about security
measures that we believe the WFP-Ethiopia and other humanitarian organizations should consider
implementing to enhance the distribution of aid.
4.1 TRACKING TECHNOLOGY
Security technology allows the WFP both to actively manage its trips in real time and gather reliable data
from which to plan future trips. Devices such as Global Positioning Systems (GPS), Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID), and accelerometers increase the visibility of assets throughout the supply chain
and provide valuable information about road conditions. In this section we will introduce these tracking
technologies and discuss the beneficial features and risks of implementing them in humanitarian
organizations such as the World Food Programme (WFP). Given the importance and relevance of GPS to
the WFP, we will place special emphasis on that particular technology.
4.1.1 GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS)
Global Positioning System (GPS) is a satellite navigation system originally developed by the Department
of Defense for military use around the globe. Although originally restricted for the military, GPS became
publicly available in the 1990s and has since proven itself in the commercial sector. GPS technology
consists of three separate segments: the space segment (satellite), the control segment, (control
stations at home offices), and the user segment (GPS receiver units). (Garmin Ltd., 2008). Not only is
the system capital heavy, but the implementation of the GPS receiver units into individual vehicles can
be a laborious process.
Organizations implement GPS units either as part of a covert system or an overt system. Vehicles with
overt systems have GPS units out in the open whereas vehicles with covert systems have GPS units
hidden within the vehicle. Both overt and covert tracking have benefits and drawbacks. In overt
tracking, the driver knows that he/she is being tracked. The GPS device is not hidden from the driver
and may even be easily identifiable from outside of the truck. Although this may make the GPS unit a
target for theft, it will also act as a psychological deterrent for drivers and other insurgents interested in
stealing cargo. In areas with prevalent theft, hijacking, corruption, and robbery, a driver's temptation to
stray from doing his/her job decreases as accountability increases from the GPS tracking capability.
In covert tracking, the organization embeds a GPS unit within the cargo without the driver's knowledge.
Covert tracking focuses on recovering stolen goods and has no effect as a deterrent since the driver
remains unaware that he/she is being tracked. Covert tracking is more effective in countries where law
enforcement security firms respond quickly (within 20 minutes) since, with a prompt response, law
enforcers can recover lost goods more successfully. However, without a prompt response, the goods
will be lost along with the GPS unit itself.
4.1.1.1 Benefits of Implementing GPS
GPS can have a profound effect on the security of a fleet. Accurate information about characteristics
such as speed, idle time, time of movement, and location provides visibility beneficial to effective
monitoring and route security. Further, GPS technologies can psychologically deter corrupt or risky
behavior. In the case of overt units, potentially corrupt individuals note that having a GPS unit on board
means that stealing cargo is risky. Additionally, in less secure areas, fuel is often used as a means of
bribery. Monitoring its consumption can identify inappropriate drivers and fuel usage.
Many public sector organizations have implemented GPS units. The United States Army and the Army
and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) both rely heavily on GPS to monitor and secure vehicles during
transportation through their current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan - two areas widely considered
insecure. The United States Army system created a Movement Tracking System (MTS) to accurately
monitor the movement of vehicles during operations. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show examples of the
computer based system installed inside vehicles as well as the satellite communication device installed
on vehicles. For more information on the US Army and AAFES operations, refer to Appendices E and H.
FIGURE 4.1: A mobile Army MTS computer system installed in a vehicle
(Source: Tapp, 2004)
FIGURE 4.2: The satellite communications device (the white box) used to transmit data for MTS
(Source: Tapp, 2004)
Also, several New York school districts recently integrated GPS into school bus fleets. Unlike the Army
and AAFES which focus on securing and tracking goods, the New York Public School Systems focus on
securing and tracking students. The September 11 attacks catapulted security into an extreme priority
for the citizens of New York City. Implementing GPS provided a peace of mind about the location of
school children during their commute to and from school. (GeoPhys.com, 2006).
GPS systems have several add-on beneficial features that can alert organizations in real time if an
unexpected event occurs. As humanitarian organizations are often located in insecure areas, these
features are particularly relevant. In the case of WFP, a quick reaction to an alert can help re-route the
vehicle or determine an appropriate course of action. Over the next few paragraphs, we introduce both
established GPS features, such as geo-fencing and time-fencing, and newer features, such as geo-
tagging, that have yet to be fully incorporated into transportation-related GPS devices.
Geo-fencing
A geo-fence notifies the control system when a vehicle exits the perimeter of an administrator-
placed virtual boundary and sends along with the coordinates of the boundary breach. Refer to
Figure 4.3 for an example of a virtual boundary set by an organization.
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FIGURE 4.3: An example of a virtual boundary set up for the purposes of geo-fencing
(Source: International ® AwareTM Vehicle Intelligence)
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Organizations with regular routes in insecure areas may benefit from this type of alert as it may
signify a potential hijacking or robbery. Though humanitarian organizations do not want or need to
locate rebel groups, this feature can help these organizations to avoid dangerous locations.
The American Red Cross has hundreds of Emergency Response Vehicles responsible for transporting
aid in disaster and emergency situations. Unfortunately, because the Red Cross has had trouble
monitoring their vehicles in these frantic situations, especially during Hurricane Katrina, it
implemented GPS units with geo-fencing. (Refer to Appendix F). The New York Public School
System's implementation of GPS also includes geo-fencing capabilities, specifically to identify
potential hijacking situations. When a school bus breaches a boundary, officials immediately receive
a message through modes of communication including email, mobile phone, text messages, and
pagers. (GeoPhys.com, 2006).
Geo-tagging
Geo-tagging, also known as geo-coding, notifies a system of a landmark by attaching geographical
information (such as names or geographic coordinates), to data as requested by the GPS unit user.
(NationMaster Encyclopedia). Popularly used in photography, organizations can implement this
feature into the vehicle by using something as simple as a button which, when pressed, can record
the exact coordinates where the specified landmark was seen. For humanitarian organizations, this
function could mark specific locations or landmarks of interest during transportation such as
checkpoints, recent locations of rebel activity, or areas on which road conditions are too poor to
drive.
Time-fencing
A time-fence, similar to a geo-fence, sets boundaries which, if exceeded, will activate an alarm or an
alert. Time-related actions such as unexpected stops will send a notification that an unscheduled
event has taken place. If a vehicle scheduled to rest on an overnight trip suddenly starts to move,
an alert will notify the organization.
Deactivation locks
A deactivating lock in the back of the trailer can be linked to a GPS unit, only allowing the trailer to
open after the truck has arrived at its destination. Upon arrival at the destination, the driver can call
into the monitoring center to have it released. If someone cuts the door open en route or without
authorization, an alarm will send a notification of a possible theft. For humanitarian organizations,
this would restrict the times at which doors could open, deterring those who seek to steal the aid en
route.
4.1.1.2 Risks of Implementing GPS
Despite the increased visibility provided by GPS, various disadvantages still exist. Carrier hesitation, high
operating costs, and inaccuracies of data might cause several difficulties in implementing this
technology. More importantly, GPS tools, though useful for monitoring, do not guarantee the security
of the goods during transportation.
Carrier Hesitation
First and foremost, carriers may resist the idea of having their vehicles tracked at all times.
Drivers may also question the purpose of an overt GPS unit. Particularly in less technologically
advanced regions, drivers may become suspect the GPS unit to be bomb with remote
detonation or something more dangerous. Currently, the WFP hopes to contract with a
dedicated fleet. However, this resistance and hesitation may drastically reduce the pool of
eligible carriers, indirectly increasing carrier rates for humanitarian organizations.
Cost
Organizations must consider a number of costs associated with implementing GPS prior to
implementation. An organization will encounter high capital costs while establishing satellite
coverage and a control center and implementing individual GPS devices. Hiring and familiarizing
employees with the technology will also contribute to the cost. However, because the value of
aid security and beneficiary safety is unquantifiable, it is difficult to perform a cost-benefit
analysis of GPS technologies to humanitarian organizations.
Interference
Of course, technical errors that accidentally or intentionally obstruct the transmission of signals
do accompany these technology systems. The low power signal used in GPS technology is
susceptible to noise and interference from improperly designed or maintained systems as well
as commercially designed GPS jammers. Organizations must take sufficient security measures to
67
prevent interference with the signal while still allowing for the necessary transmission of data.
(Simonsen, et al, 2002)
Distribution of Aid is Not Guaranteed
Finally, the purpose of GPS implementation in the humanitarian sector is to help ensure the
proper distribution of food-aid. The WFP would likely attach the GPS unit to the vehicle instead
of to the aid itself. Subsequently, a tracked vehicle may properly arrive at its destination
without its aid, because, although overt GPS units may act as deterrents, they cannot actually
stop a robbery or hijacking from occurring. If thieves steal or destroy the unit, it will no longer
provide accurate information to the control center. Further, if rebels, or even potentially
corrupt drivers, learn to interfere with the transmitted signal, they will not get caught acting
dishonestly.
4.1.2 RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION (RFID)
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technologies transmit and identify information about an object
through wireless radio waves. An RFID system has two main components: a tag and a reader. An RFID
tag, typically a microchip, is attached to an object and holds information about the object such as the
date of manufacture and the destination. An RFID reader communicates with the tag and then passes
the digital information about the object on to a computer system. Although similar to a bar code, RFID
has significantly greater capabilities. Bar codes and bar code scanners communicate through line-of-
sight communications. Therefore, a scanner can only read information off of bar codes positioned
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directly towards the scanner. In comparison, RFID interrogators can read information from RFID tags
from any direction since RFID is based off of radio waves. The commercial sector uses RFID quite
extensively as the financial benefits generated by an RFID system outweigh the cost of the tags. (RFID
Journal, 2009)
RFID tags come with varying levels of components, capabilities, read-ranges, disposal, and cost. An
appropriate RFID system gets implemented depending on the value of the goods. Tags can be attached
to an entire shipment, a single pallet, or an individual item. Companies tend to track high value goods
using a more active and costly system with a long range for transmitting data. While simple and
disposable tags are more appropriate for commodity items, they remain quite expensive to implement
on a reasonable scale. These systems can cost anywhere from $290,000 to $5,000,000. (Robarti, 2006
and SCDigest Editorial Staff, 2009). Although companies justify the cost for high-valued goods, it is
difficult to justify the use of these tags on inexpensive commodities.
However, RFID increases visibility throughout the distribution process and provides the capability to
actively and directly monitor goods through various checkpoints. Further, because RFID tracks goods on
a more detailed level, it also tracks goods more accurately than GPS. Organizations such as the US Army
and AAFES place RFID tags directly on individual units to monitor the security each item, rather than just
a shipment or truckload.
4.1.3 ACCELEROMETERS
As seen in chapter 3, road conditions do correlate with road security. As such, an in-depth
understanding of the road conditions may help to significantly increase security. Accelerometers, which
measure various forces of acceleration including static forces (such as gravity) and dynamic forces (such
as moving) (Dimension Engineering), allow us to understand the road conditions on which the vehicle
travels. For instance, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Pothole Patrol (See Appendix G) uses
accelerometers to monitor infrastructure on and along roadways. The Pothole Patrol embedded
accelerometers in taxis to measure the dynamic velocity and vibration of vehicles in Boston and
Cambridge, Massachusetts. By coupling GPS systems with accelerometers, the project successfully
identified potholes locations, sizes, and depths on roads.
Since natural and human disasters may suddenly change road conditions in less secure areas, the ability
to gather data about road quality on a regular basis would help organizations plan accordingly for future
trips. For example, the Somali region's common floods and droughts change road conditions
consistently. Accelerometers could provide the WFP with the capability to measure and compare roads
in order to efficiently plan future routes - and potentially secure goods. Additionally, an accelerometer
could help the WFP and the government prioritize critical infrastructure improvement projects.
4.2 NON-TECHNOLOGY SECURITY MEASURES
As we have seen, technology can enhance supply chain security. However, given the capital cost and
infrastructure necessary to implement such tools, we will also introduce some non-technology
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measures. In this section we will discuss two groups of supplemental security measures. The first group
consists of tools that humanitarian organizations can utilize to monitor security - check points and
weighing stations. The second group consists of two slightly larger scale changes humanitarian
organizations may take to take to develop the security of their distributions - expanding driver
responsibilities and relying on airdrops.
4.2.1 MONITORING METHODS
The depth with which an organization monitors the distribution of goods varies with resources. As seen
in chapter 4, the WFP monitors food distribution primarily through the usage of waybills and Food
Monitors. These manual processes compare the amount allocated for a Final Destination Point (FDP)
with the amount delivered. However, while the WFP uses these processes to compare the initial and
final amounts of aid, the organization incorporates few monitoring efforts elsewhere in the distribution
process.
By creating checkpoints along distribution routes, organizations such as AAFES, who also uses private
carriers, create intermediate monitoring opportunities throughout the distribution process. An
organization will designate certain locations along routes and appoint a representative to man each
location, ensuring that the vehicles passing through contain the correct amount of aid. Organizations
should disperse checkpoints along different routes and should rotate locations periodically so that they
remain unpredictable and effective. This will allow for closer monitoring of distribution and will help
organizations identify particular areas that may present a higher risk for theft.
An organization can also employ weigh stations along distribution routes. These stations weigh vehicles
and identify any unexpected discrepancies between the amounts of aid it should and actually does have.
AAFES uses this method while transporting food to both Iraq and Afghanistan. Though weigh stations
can be less labor intensive for an organization than checkpoints, they can also require fewer people.
However, weigh stations require a slightly higher cost of capital to construct and implement.
4.2.2 OTHER SECURITY MEASURES
While monitoring tools and methods will help enhance distribution security, we have identified a few
overall larger scale approaches to increase security. These approaches may be improbable for WFP's
current status, but nevertheless, would make or maintain significant safety changes.
Ideally, a truck should continue moving at all times - otherwise, the vehicle is at higher risk for a
hijacking or looting incident. Assigning two or three drivers to a vehicle could eliminate the need for a
vehicle to stop and park during overnight trips, in turn reducing the risk that trucks face. Further, having
multiple drivers could also create a self-policing method, as drivers will be less likely to engage in
corrupt activities while someone present.
Finally, humanitarian organizations with access to resources may want to look into aerial monitoring and
distribution. As discussed in Appendix E the Army has turned to air distribution in large part to monitor
and avoid the dangers of ground transportation in Afghanistan. This method of transportation is very
costly. However, it is useful in extreme cases. The WFP already has experience using aerial delivery to
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deliver aid during times of extreme need, such as a recent 2008 fall flood in Gode. Currently, however,
the WFP only uses aerial delivery in the Somali region when roads are completely inaccessible.
4.3 PROPOSED ACTION FOR THE WFP - ETHIOPIA AND OTHER SIMILAR
ORGANIZATIONS
In this chapter, we have introduced several technologies and measures that can enhance the security of
an organization's distribution and transportation process. However, in order to decide whether or not
to really implement a specific tool into an organization, the organization must evaluate that tool against
its operating environment. The WFP-Ethiopia's Somali regions have two separate operating
environments - the Somali region itself and the WFP's internal environment. The Somali region is an
area of perceived and real risk as well as an area lacking much infrastructure (technological or
otherwise). The WFP is an organization with few resources (capital and human) as well as an
organization sometimes too large to quickly adapt to change. The technologies and tools that the WFP
does adopt in this region should, then, address security risk, work with existing infrastructure, be cost-
effective, and be easily implementable.
However, the WFP should remember that while supply chain security technologies can deter illicit
activities, technologies cannot prevent them. Therefore, the WFP cannot evaluate a technology as a
standalone provider of security. Also, while the WFP has limited capital resources, the need to ensure
beneficiary aid and safety will always outweigh the raw cost of a tool that really enhances security. If
two similar technologies have very different costs, then the WFP should choose to use the less
expensive one. However, the cost of the general technology may not always be prohibitive.
Given this analysis, we propose that the WFP implement Global Positioning Systems (GPS) onto its
dedicated fleet of vehicles. GPS has several technical and psychological benefits that will help secure an
organization's supply chain. By implementing GPS, the WFP will have a chance to not only track the
progression of its contracted carriers, but also speculate upon potential hazards. The WFP should also
enlist the geo-fencing and deactivation lock add-ons if possible. The geo-fencing capability will send a
real-time alert in the case of a hijacking that takes the vehicle outside the bounds of its route, while a
deactivation lock will prevent rebels from obtaining the food-aid. Depending on the additional cost of
geo-tagging and time-fencing, the WFP may consider purchasing these features as well. However, we
consider those technologies to be less necessary as they may present the WFP with several false alarms.
Since the expected travel time for a route varies greatly depending on the need for escorts and current
road condition and also since drivers may manually mark the location of an incident or security breach,
those add-ons may cost more than their worth to the WFP.
As mentioned, the WFP should also implement GPS overtly within its vehicles. In areas with low
regulatory quality, control of corruption, political stability, and rule of law, such as the Somali region, a
deterrent such as an overt system has more potential to enhance security than a covert system. An
insurgent group may back off when it comes upon an aid truck armed with a covert GPS unit. If they
know the purpose of the unit, the insurgents may fear tracking by the government. Otherwise, they
may assume that the unit has some more dangerous purpose. Further, drivers themselves will resist
assisting insurgent groups if they know that the WFP will monitor their behavior.
The system requires little infrastructure outside of the WFP's vehicles and home office. However,
implementation of GPS may not be trouble-free. Although the implementation of individual units is
technically simple, each and every vehicle in the WFP's dedicated fleet will need a unit. This implies, of
course, that drivers will need to attach the units to their trucks. However, if truck drivers fear the GPS
unit (fearing either monitoring or that the unit is actually something more dangerous), they may not
place the units within their vehicles in a timely manner. Further, the control system of the GPS will need
some technological infrastructure at the country home office in Addis Ababa. While the WFP office in
Addis is equipped with internet technology, the service is intermittent and may mean a slower system.
However, if the WFP can temper expectations of the system with its employees, then the office will
tolerate a slower GPS monitoring tool and change along with the system.
GPS infrastructure and units come at a high price. However, for the security service it provides the
WFP's distribution system and the timely nourishment it may help to provide beneficiaries with, the cost
may be negligible. Further, in comparison to RFID technologies that have high infrastructure needs,
difficult implementation, as well as extravagant costs, GPS's costs are attractive.
Finally, the WFP should use GPS devices in coordination with other security measures. Firstly, we
believe that escorts play an extremely important role in the safety the WFP's distribution system.
Though traveling with an escort can double the driving time of a route, these escorts also prevent rebel
activity, hijackings, lootings and other security issues. However, to continue increasing the efficiencies
of the escort system, the WFP should also maintain its Joint Committees with the government and
military. With this simple committee, the WFP has already tripled its efficiency.
5 CONCLUSION
The Ethiopian government has handed over to the WFP the difficult task of delivering food-aid into the
insecure Somali region. However, though the instability of the Somali environment directly and
indirectly increases the theft and loss of food as well as the prices of carriers, the WFP has made
incredible strides in actively and efficiently securing its distribution process. Through the creative use of
Joint Committees and carrier contracts along with the insightful use of Food Monitors, the WFP has
involved each of the distribution stakeholders in the planning of its supply chain.
While the WFP can add technological capabilities to its repertoire of security measures, the technology
itself will not prevent rebellion, insurgency, theft, or hijacking. Like many organizations', the key to
WFP's supply chain success lies in its communication strategy.
The WFP's strategy of strong local communication and decentralized decision-making enhances their
relationship building efforts. At each level of duty, the WFP has built strong relationships - either with
the government, with escorts, or with the beneficiaries. For instance, at the EDP level, the WFP
communicates expansively with the government and military through the Joint Committee, performing
overall decision-making for that area. This further allows the WFP to contract with local carriers,
mitigating risk of en route hijackings. Similarly, by hiring local staff to monitor food activities at FDPs,
the WFP can directly work with beneficiaries to gain their knowledge without losing their trust. This
strategy of strong local communication and decentralized decision-making generates a sense of
responsibility and importance for each person involved in the supply chain. It is through this sense of
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ownership that individuals will resist temptation of illicit activities and commit to distributing food-aid in
an efficient and honest manner.
Though the WFP's individual country organizations operate as separate entities, they would all benefit
greatly from coming together to trade "industry" secrets. The different WFP country offices do not
necessarily know what one another accomplishes. Each country office, especially in similar geographic
areas, could conference the other organizations in their responsibilities, duties, relationships, and
progress. Operations facing similar distribution disturbances could explore successful solutions and
allow collaboration that could increase efficiencies and shorten implementation processes. Ultimately,
each unit would benefit from increased transparency among the entire organization and sector in
general.
The WFP should also continue to quantify and analyze the environment of risk that it operates within. It
is through such analysis that the WFP can understand the rates charged by carriers, the amount of loss it
actually incurs, and affect of mandated processes such as escort. With this knowledge, it can re-
negotiate with authorities, private carriers, and other supply-chain stakeholders to receive the most
efficient service. More importantly, with this knowledge, the WFP can begin to disperse lessons learned
to other humanitarian organizations.
In conclusion, the lessons we have learned from this project are applicable to all humanitarian
organizations in less secure areas. By using local resources, decentralizing decision-making, and
maintaining superior relations with the government, humanitarian organizations can secure their supply
chains. Further, with a few simple technologies, these organizations can enhance security and claim
peace of mind.
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APPENDIX A: BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON INSURGENCY IN THE
SOMALI REGION
According to the US Department of State's travel information for Ethiopia (2008), "domestic insurgent
groups, extremists from Somalia, and the heavy military buildup along the northern border pose risks to
safety and security, particularly along Ethiopia's border areas and in the Somali region." A few of these
risks are organized armed insurgent groups such as the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the
United Western Somali Liberation Front (UWSLF) as well as the prevalence of clans and poor road
conditions. These risks cause the Somali region to remain unpredictable and volatile.
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)
The ONLF has been battling the Ethiopian Defense Force (EDF) for years in an attempt to gain greater
autonomy for the Somali region (Reuters ALertNet, 2007). In 2007, the "ONLF killed 74 people in an
attack on a Chinese run oil exploration field" (Reuters AlertNet 2007) and since then, the government
has attempted to concentrate on controlling the insurgency. However, according to the US State
Department, a "hotel in the town of Jijiga was bombed and two hotels in the town of Negele Borena
were bombed" in 2008 and as recently as February 2009, fierce battles between the ONLF, EDF and
militia have taken place with numerous casualties. During a five day battle from February 2009, 140
Ethiopian soldiers and 29 ONLF members were killed. Although the numbers of casualties is disputed by
the government, the fact that fighting took place was not. (McLure, 2009).
United Western Somali Liberation Front (UWSLF)
According to a press release published in the Sudan Tribute (2006), "the United Western Somali
Liberation Front (UWSLF) ... is political and armed organization dedicated for the right and freedom of
Western Somali (Ogaden)". A military communiqu6 from the UWSLF Information Office in 2006
announced an attack that took place in the Somali region in which 39 soldiers were killed. In September
of 2006, 2 International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (ICRC) members were kidnapped
and subsequently released (ICRC, 2006).
Clan Fighting
The Somali region is home to a significant number of nomadic clans and sub clans. However, these clans
often fight with each other over basic needs such as land and water sources. In 2006, two sub-clans
who belonged to the same parent clan, had a disagreement about "the construction of a water
reservoir" which resulted in 39 deaths (IRIN-Africa, 2006). More recently, 300 people were killed and
thousands were forced to flee their homes as a result of clan fighting between the Borana or Oromo and
the Garre of Somali. "Violent clashes often occur between the Borana Oromo and Garre Somali, mostly
over territorial disagreements and over scarce resources for the two pastoralist communities. The
recent drought in southern Ethiopia has escalated the conflict over water wells." (Jimma Times, 2009).
APPENDIX B: SAMPLE WFP REQUEST FOR QUOTATION (RFQ)
Request for Quotations (RfQ)
Our Reference: #
March 3, 2009
The above reference number must be indicated on all replies
Offers are invited for a period of six (6) months for the purpose of transportation service of the below
described commodities under the terms and conditions contained herein.
Only offers received by WFP Ethiopia under following fax number will be accepted: Fax #
(Confidential Fax Line or directly into the Tender box as per below address.
1. Cargo:
1.1 Various Commodities:
Cargo packed in Bags at a unit weight between 50Kg - 25 Kg: Cereals, Pulse, Blended Food
(CSB/Famix) and Vegetable Oil.
Cargo Packed in Cartons, Boxes, Tins, and Jerycans at a unit weight between 18Kg - 24Kg:
Vegetable Oil.
2. Origin:
2.1 WFP Warehouse
2.2 Loaded on mode of transport / trucks:
- Free on Trucks at WFP and or counter parts warehouses (See attached table)..
3. Destination(s)
3.1. Location(s):
Flat rate per Woreda is applicable to the below listed destinations upto FDP level, and for any
new FDP that may come out due to the Emergency operation. Unless stated otherwise in writing
from WFP, the attached list of destinations are considered operational sites. (Table deleted
upon request from WFP)
Total of minimum 3,500 MT of Mixed Commodities per month for all destinations up to FDP.
3.2 Allocation (quantity per commodity and destination will be communicated to carriers by means
of a loading order (LTI)
WFP also reserves the right to change the quantities to the various specific destinations as
necessary to react to changing circumstances.
4. Offer
4.1 Your offer should be Flat Rate per Woreda in Eth Birr per MT Gross, and transportation has to
be up To FDP Level under the Woreda. Flate rate should be applicable for any new FDP that
can arise under its Woreda. Flat rates are all inclusive of the services listed below.
Rates, which will remain valid for 6 months period regardless of the tonnage/quantity to be
transported as advised by WFP.
4.2. Offers will not be valid unless clearly indicated in the attached Quotation.
4.3 Transporters who are not interested to quote for this RFQ are requested to send their regret on
the tender fax or deliver the same to the tender box.
5. Services required
5.1. The selected transporter(s) will be requested to confirm the available transport capacity prior
the issuance of Landside transport instruction hereinafter referred to as LTI (loading order).
5.2. Upon receipt of the LTI (Loading order), the transporter must position the trucks at the loading
point within 24 hours. The transporter must ensure the loaded tonnage does not exceed the
axle load limitation in the country where the transport will take place.
5.3. The transporter must also ensure the driver and trucks have all the necessary permits and
documentation to carry out the requested transport.
5.4. The Transport Company ensures that the relief commodities are lifted within the time frame
specified on the LTI and each consignment (truckload) delivered within the maximum delivery
time given in the LTI.
6. Costs
6.1 All costs to be incurred, envisaged by the Contractor and considered to be for the account of
WFP must be included at this stage. No other costs other than those included in the offer will be
accepted.
6.2. Said costs are to be applied to the distance covered under load to the destinations, return
distance being always excluded
Handling cost is paid by WFP.
6.3. For bagged commodities, the payment will be made based on Gross weight as per WFP waybill.
Vegetable Oil will be paid on actual truck pay load (as certified by Ethiopian Road Transport
Authority) and with maximum carton stacking of 6 layers. Trucks with high sideboard ('sponda')
are preferred for Oil loads.
6.4. All costs arising from Transporter non-performance or poor performance of the Contractor shall
be for Transporter account.
The rates quoted will remain valid for a period of one year from the date of the award.
6.5. WFP reserves the right to extend the validity of the rate quoted for a further period of time to
be notified later and agreed by all parties.
7. Commencement, execution and Completion of transport/and other services required:
7.1. Date of Commencement: Upon award
Completion Date: After 6 months
7.2 WFP shall inform the Contractor in advance of the commencement date of the operation and
inform the Contractor through the Loading Order (specifying quantity and destination). Under
all circumstances, the Contractor will co-ordinate closely with WFP.
7.3 The overall performance of the Contractor will influence future evaluation of offers. The
following criteria are considered by WFP while assessing the Transport Company performance:
* Promptness in placing trucks at loading point
* Completion of uplift within period specified in the LTI (Loading order)
* Completion of delivery within agreed delivery time
* Nil or minimum transit losses
* Prompt and comprehensive reporting
* Continuous feedback in case of breakdown, accident or security incident
* Failure to perform as per your submitted offer will lead to a temporary suspension of at
least 6 months or even an exclusion from the WFP short-list.
* Accurate presentation of transporter invoice to WFP.
7.4 Should the Contractor fail to provide required transport capacity in the agreed period of time
WFP reserves the right to charge to the Contractor the penalty of ETB 20 (Twenty Ethiopian Birr)
per MT for each day of delay until the agreed tonnage is uplifted or the LTI/Transport Instruction
or Award terminated.
7.5 All transport must be carried out safely and expeditiously; The contractor will be responsible for
providing the required amount of transport units (e.g. number of trucks) to complete the
delivery within the agreed period and take all necessary steps to ensure that all transport units
are in good operational condition at all times.
8. Missing / Damaged commodities:
8.1 The cargo shall be delivered at the destination in good condition and the contractor shall take all
necessary precautions for the care of the cargo whilst under his responsibility. The contractor
shall assume full responsibility for the cargo (quantity, condition and integrity) whilst in his
custody or that of his employees, agents or subcontractors.
8.2 Leakage and / or spillage shall not be tolerated and shall be considered as losses (missing
quantities). For the purpose of this RfQ, leakage or spillage is defined as a shortage in weight of
units at destination compared with the weight of units as declared on the waybill and signed at
the point of origin where the contractor took over the responsibility over the commodities.
8.3 All missing or damaged commodities and any excess spillage or leakage during the period under
your responsibility will be debited against transport invoices based on the arrived commodity
value or the market value at final destination, whichever is greater. The arrived value at
destination is calculated by adding all transport and related costs to the value of commodity at
source.
8.4 Damaged/missing items shall be identified by WFP and /or its superintendents or/and
designated consignee and recorded on transport waybill, which has to be signed by both, the
contractor and consignee/receiving party.
8.5 The Contractor shall not be obliged to load damaged cargo at the point of cargo receipt, unless
expressly requested by WFP, in writing, and agreed to by the contractor
9. Awarding
WFP reserves the right to award the agreement to one or more contractors. WFP reserves the
right to withdraw the award in whole or in part should the successful contractor be unable to
provide uptake capacity necessary or the delivery within the specific period and/or is unable to
provide in full the agreed services.
10. Payments
10.1 Payment shall be made within 30 working days only upon the receipt of a query free invoice in
line with the Loading Order and quantities specified there in.
10.2 The invoice(s) must be accompanied by originally signed transport waybills for the entire
movement duly signed and stamped (indicating number of units received) by official recipient of
WFP official/consignee and the WFP Loading Order.
10.3 Payment by WFP will be effected directly into a Bank account or check in the country wherein
the movement is taking place, or where the trucks as well as contractor are registered.
11. Liability
WFP, the United Nations, its agencies and organizations, its employees and agents shall be
exempt from any liability in respect of any direct, indirect or consequential loss and/or damage
and/or injury sustained by the contractor, its employees, agents or any third party arising from
this agreement or the performance thereof which is undertaken entirely at the risk of the
contractor, its agents, or employees. Should any claim arise, the contractor will indemnify WFP
and hold harmless WFP, United Nations, its agencies and organizations, its employees and
agents from any liability.
In addition, the Contractor shall assume full responsibility for any fraudulent and/or illegal acts it
commits knowingly or unknowingly and WFP shall be exempt from any liability whatsoever in
this respect.
12. Reporting
The Contractor shall fulfil reporting obligations regularly to WFP Ethiopia as agreed during
transport operations, through electronic mail (see below addresses) or by fax (WFP Logistics
Office Fax # 00251-115-503799 )or via mobile phone
13. Law and Arbitration Clause
This Agreement, and any dispute arising there from, shall be governed by general principles of
law, to the exclusion of any single national system of law. Any dispute between the parties
concerning the interpretation and the execution of the Contract that is unresolved after
conciliation shall, at the request of either party be settled by arbitration in accordance with the
Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), as
at present in force. Any arbitration award rendered in accordance with the provisions of this
article shall be final and binding on the Parties.
14. UN Immunity Clause
Nothing in this agreement shall imply a waiver by United Nations World Food Programme, the
United Nations or any of its Agencies or Organizations of any privileges or immunity enjoyed by
them or by their acceptance of the jurisdiction of the courts of any country over disputes arising
out of this agreement.
15. Termination
15.1 Any non-performance related to the terms and conditions of this RFQ by the Contractor shall
be deemed as a breach of the agreement and the agreement may be terminated immediately by
WFP
15.2 In the event that Carrier commits an act of bankruptcy or has a receiving order made against
him or makes any arrangement with his creditors or if distress or execution is levied or
threatened upon any of Carrier's property, this Agreement shall automatically and without
notice terminate.
15.3 If relief operations to Ethiopia are suspended or if WFP for any reason whatsoever ceases to
operate an emergency relief Programme in the Ethiopia, this Agreement shall terminate without
notice.
15.4 In the event of termination of this Agreement Carrier will deliver all cargos in transit to their
destinations and return any equipment belong to WFP within a reasonable period of time.
15.5 If at any time during the course of the Award it shall become impossible for any of the parties
hereto to perform any of its obligations for reason of force majeure, that party shall promptly
notify the other in writing of the existence of such force majeure whereupon the party giving
notice shall be relieved from such obligations as long as force majeure persists.
16. Sexual Exploitation and Abuse:
The United Nations and WFP are committed to the protection of vulnerable populations in
humanitarian crisis, including from sexual exploitation or abuse. By entering into an agreement
with WFP, the Contractor undertakes to adhere to the standard of conduct established to this
effect by the United Nations and to ensure that its personnel conforms to the highest standards
of moral and ethical conduct. Any failure by the Contractor to take preventive measures against
sexual exploitation or abuse, to investigate allegations thereof or to take corrective action, shall
constitute grounds for termination of the agreement.
Contractor employees are prohibited from staying overnight at a beneficiary camp.
17. Replies
(Deleted for disclosure purposes)
APPENDIX C: RAW DATA FROM CARRIER ANALYSIS
EDP FDP Cost($) I Driving % % % Dirt/
km Time (hrs) Paved Gravel Other
1 C 0.01123 3.786 0% 0% 100%
1 C 0.01056 3.786 0% 0% 100%
1 C 0.01175 3.786 0% 0% 100%
1 C 0.01123 3.786 0% 0% 100%
1 C 0.01123 3.786 0% 0% 100%
1 C 0.01056 3.786 0% 0% 100%
1 D 0.00246 6.394 60% 24% 17%
1 D 0.00227 6.394 60% 24% 17%
1 D 0.00302 6.394 60% 24% 17%
1 D 0.00265 6.394 60% 24% 17%
1 D 0.00302 6.394 60% 24% 17%
1 D 0.00299 6.394 60% 24% 17%
1 D 0.00265 6.394 60% 24% 17%
1 D 0.00246 6.394 60% 24% 17%
1 F 0.00246 5.363 78% 20% 2%
1 F 0.00246 5.363 78% 20% 2%
1 F 0.00246 5.363 78% 20% 2%
1 F 0.00246 5.363 78% 20% 2%
1 F 0.00246 5.363 78% 20% 2%
1 F 0.00246 5.363 78% 20% 2%
1 H 0.00257 20.620 0% 43% 57%
1 H 0.00267 20.620 0% 43% 57%
1 H 0.00267 20.620 0% 43% 57%
1 H 0.00267 20.620 0% 43% 57%
1 H 0.00267 20.620 0% 43% 57%
1 H 0.00267 20.620 0% 43% 57%
1 H 0.00267 20.620 0% 43% 57%
1 H 0.00267 20.620 0% 43% 57%
1 H 0.00267 20.620 0% 43% 57%
1 H 0.00248 20.620 0% 43% 57%
1 H 0.00267 20.620 0% 43% 57%
1 J 0.00419 11.935 0% 0% 100%
1 J 0.00419 11.935 0% 0% 100%
1 J 0.00419 11.935 0% 0% 100%
1 J 0.00419 11.935 0% 0% 100%
1 J 0.00419 11.935 0% 0% 100%
1 P 0.00559 4.946 0% 95% 5%
1 P 0.00559 4.946 0% 95% 5%
1 P 0.00638 4.946 0% 95% 5%
1 P 0.00638 4.946 0%o 95% 5%
1 P 0.00692 4.946 0% 95% 5%
1 P 0.00638 4.946 0% 95% 5%
1 Z 0.00567 10.580 0% 0% 100%
1 Z 0.0052 10.580 0% 0% 100%
1 Z 0.00567 10.580 0% 0% 100%
1 Z 0.00567 10.580 0% 0% 100%
1 Z 0.00567 10.580 0% 0% 100%
1 Z 0.00567 10.580 0% 0% 100%
1 Z 0.0052 10.580 0% 0% 100%
Green
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67%
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67%
67%
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100%
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100%
100%
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100%
100%o
33%
33%
33%
33%
33%
33%
33%
Total
Risk
2.667
2.667
2.667
2.667
2.667
2.000
0.569
0.569
0.569
0.569
0.569
0.569
0.569
0.569
0.235
0.235
0.235
0.235
0.235
0.235
1.907
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1.907
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2.500
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2.500
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2.500
3.053
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3.0533.053
2.667
2.667
2.667
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2.667
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Cost($) I Driving % % % Dirt/EDP FDP km Time (hrs) Paved Gravel Other
1 Z 0.0052 10.580 0% 0% 100%
1 Z 0.00567 10.580 0% 0% 100%
1 Z 0.0052 10.580 0% 0% 100%
1 Z 0.00543 10.580 0% 0% 100%
1 Z 0.00543 10.580 0% 0% 100%
1 EE 0.00275 4.088 94% 0% 6%
1 EE 0.00275 4.088 94% 0% 6%
1 EE 0.00275 4.088 94% 0% 6%
1 GG 0.00257 6.952 59% 18% 23%
1 GG 0.00257 6.952 59% 18% 23%
1 GG 0.00257 6.952 59% 18% 23%
1 GG 0.00257 6.952 59% 18% 23%
1 GG 0.00242 6.952 59% 18% 23%
1 GG 0.00242 6.952 59% 18% 23%
1 GG 0.00242 6.952 59% 18% 23%
1 GG 0.00257 6.952 59% 18% 23%
1 GG 0.00257 6.952 59% 18% 23%
1 II 0.00474 1.812 98% 0% 2%
1 II 0.00521 1.812 98% 0% 2%
1 II 0.00521 1.812 98% 0% 2%
1 II 0.00474 1.812 98% 0% 2%
1 II 0.00559 1.812 98% 0% 2%
1 II 0.00559 1.812 98% 0% 2%/
1 II 0.00559 1.812 98% 0% 2%
1 II 0.00559 1.812 98% 0% 2%
1 II 0.00559 1.812 98% 0% 2%
1 II 0.00521 1.812 98% 0% 2%
1 UU 0.00393 7.816 0% 98% 2%
1 UU 0.00393 7.816 0% 98% 2%
1 UU 0.00458 7.816 0% 98% 2%
1 UU 0.00393 7.816 0% 98% 2%
1 UU 0.00393 7.816 0% 98% 2%
1 CC 0.01652 3.329 0% 0% 100%
1 CC 0.01577 3.329 0% 0% 100%
1 CC 0.01803 3.329 0% 0% 100%
1 CC 0.01652 3.329 00/0 0% 100%
1 CC 0.01652 3.329 0% 0% 100%
1 M 0.00975 2.309 0% 87% 13%
1 M 0.00975 2.309 0% 87% 13%
1 M 0.00975 2.309 0% 87% 13%
1 M 0.00975 2.309 0% 87% 13%
1 M 0.00975 2.309 00/% 87% 13%
2 B 0.0053 3.618 1% 61% 37%
2 B 0.0053 3.618 1% 61% 37%
2 B 0.0053 3.618 1% 61% 37%
2 B 0.00474 3.618 1% 61% 37%
2 E 0.00275 4.090 1% 99% 0%
2 E 0.00214 4.090 1% 99% 0%
2 E 0.00294 4.090 1% 99% 0%
2 E 0.00294 4.090 1% 99% 0%
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Total
Risk
2.667
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0.123
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0.644
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EDP FDP Cost($) Driving % % % Dirtlkm Time (hrs) Paved Gravel Other
2 E 0.00238 4.090 1% 99% 0%
2 E 0.00214 4.090 1% 99% 0%
2 E 0.00201 4.090 1% 99% 0%
2 E 0.00294 4.090 1% 99% 0%
2 E 0.00294 4.090 1% 99% 0%
2 E 0.00294 4.090 1% 99% 0%
2 E 0.00275 4.090 1% 99% 0%0
2 E 0.00299 4.090 1% 99% 0%
2 0 0.00633 2.303 1% 88% 11%
2 0 0.00601 2.303 1% 88% 11%
2 0 0.00601 2.303 1% 88% 11%
2 0 0.00589 2.303 1% 88% 11%
2 0 0.00469 2.303 1% 88% 11%
2 0 0.00601 2.303 1% 88% 11%
2 0 0.00601 2.303 1% 88% 11%
2 0 0.00633 2.303 1% 88% 11%
2 0 0.00601 2.303 1% 88% 11%
2 0 0.00601 2.303 1% 88% 11%
2 0 0.00601 2.303 1% 88% 11%
2 0 0.00601 2.303 1% 88% 11%
2 0 0.00601 2.303 1% 88% 11%
2 U 0.00579 1.880 2% 89% 9%
2 U 0.00579 1.880 2% 89% 9%
2 U 0.00506 1.880 2% 89% 9%
2 U 0.00506 1.880 2% 89% 9%
2 U 0.00506 1.880 2% 89% 9%
2 U 0.00362 1.880 2% 89% 9%
2 U 0.00622 1.880 2%/0 89% 9%
2 U 0.00636 1.880 2% 89% 9%
2 U 0.00636 1.880 2% 89% 9%
2 U 0.00636 1.880 2% 89% 9%
2 U 0.00636 1.880 2% 89% 9%
2 W 0.00325 8.999 30% 22% 48%
2 W 0.00287 8.999 30% 22% 48%
2 W 0.00287 8.999 30% 22% 48%
2 W 0.00317 8.999 30% 22% 48%
2 W 0.00325 8.999 30% 22% 48%
2 W 0.00325 8.999 30% 22% 48%
2 FF 0.00385 5.766 31% 69% 0%
2 FF 0.00385 5.766 31% 69% 0%
2 FF 0.00385 5.766 31% 69% 0%
2 FF 0.00346 5.766 31% 69% 0%
2 FF 0.00385 5.766 31% 69% 0%
2 FF 0.00463 5.766 31% 69% 0%
2 HH 0.00262 2.631 93% 7% 0%
2 HH 0.00262 2.631 93% 7% 0%
2 HH 0.00262 2.631 93% 7% 0%
2 HH 0.00262 2.631 93% 7% 0%
2 HH 0.00262 2.631 93% 7% 0%
2 HH 0.00294 2.631 93% 7% 0%
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0.994
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Cost($) I Driving % % % Dirt/
km Time (hrs) Paved Gravel Other
2 HH 0.00294 2.631 93% 7% 0%
2 HH 0.00327 2.631 93% 7% 0%
2 HH 0.00262 2.631 93% 7% 0%
2 MM 0.00337 11.000 9% 36% 55%
2 00 0.00229 3.781 100% 0% 0%
2 00 0.00229 3.781 100% 0% 0%
2 00 0.00229 3.781 100% 0% 0%
2 00 0.00229 3.781 100% 0% 0%
2 00 0.00229 3.781 100% 0% 0%
2 RR 0.00216 7.950 72% 27% 0%
2 RR 0.00276 7.950 72% 27% 0%
2 RR 0.00264 7.950 72% 27% 0%
2 RR 0.00276 7.950 72% 27% 0%
2 RR 0.00276 7.950 72% 27% 0%
2 VV 0.00067 12.903 50% 47% 3%
2 VV 0.00067 12.903 50% 47% 3%
2 VV 0.00067 12.903 50% 47% 3%
2 VV 0.00067 12.903 50% 47% 3%
2 VV 0.00067 12.903 50% 47% 3%
2 VV 0.00067 12.903 50% 47% 3%
2 VV 0.00067 12.903 50% 47% 3%
2 VV 0.00067 12.903 50% 47% 3%
2 VV 0.00067 12.903 50% 47% 3%
2 VV 0.00067 12.903 50% 47% 3%
2 VV 0.00067 12.903 50% 47% 3%
2 VV 0.00067 12.903 50% 47% 3%
2 VV 0.00067 12.903 50% 47% 3%
2 VV 0.00067 12.903 50% 47% 3%
2 SS 0.00553 11.895 9% 33% 58%
2 NN 0.00516 3.706 45% 55% 0%
2 NN 0.00516 3.706 45% 55% 0%
2 NN 0.00052 3.706 45% 55% 0%
3 A 0.00718 1.671 0% 86% 14%
3 A 0.00941 1.671 0% 86% 14%
3 A 0.01052 1.671 0% 86% 14%
3 A 0.00941 1.671 0% 86% 14%
3 A 0.00941 1.671 0% 86% 14%
3 A 0.01026 1.671 0% 86% 14%
3 A 0.01146 1.671 0% 86% 14%
3 A 0.01197 1.671 0% 86% 14%
3 G 0.00508 7.820 0% 73% 27%
3 G 0.00508 7.820 0% 73% 27%
3 G 0.00508 7.820 0% 73% 27%
3 G 0.00508 7.820 0% 73% 27%
3 G 0.00508 7.820 0% 73% 27%
3 G 0.00508 7.820 0% 73% 27%
3 G 0.00508 7.820 0% 73% 27%
3 G 0.00508 7.820 0% 73% 27%
3 G 0.00508 7.820 0% 73% 27%
3 N 0.01269 1.576 0% 100% 0%
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100%
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3 N 0.01269 1.576 0% 100% 0% 0
3 N 0.01269 1.576 0% 100% 0%
3 S 0.00628 8.685 0% 2% 98%
3 S 0.00571 8.685 0% 2% 98%
3 S 0.00571 8.685 0% 2% 98%
3 S 0.00571 8.685 0% 2% 98%
3 S 0.00571 8.685 0% 2% 98%/
3 S 0.00571 8.685 0% 2% 98%
3 V 0.00546 6.706 0% 78% 22%
3 V 0.00546 6.706 0% 78% 22%
3 V 0.00546 6.706 0% 78% 22%
3 V 0.00546 6.706 0%/o 78% 22%
3 V 0.00546 6.706 0% 78% 22%
3 AA 0.00381 16.439 0% 44% 56%
3 AA 0.00381 16.439 0% 44% 56%
3 AA 0.00381 16.439 0% 44% 56%
3 AA 0.00381 16.439 0% 44% 56%
3 AA 0.00381 16.439 0% 44% 56%
3 AA 0.00381 16.439 0% 44% 56%
/
3 AA 0.00369 16.439 0% 44% 56%
3 AA 0.00397 16.439 0% 44% 56%
3 AA 0.00404 16.439 0% 44% 56%
3 AA 0.00404 16.439 0% 44% 56%
3 AA 0.00404 16.439 0% 44% 56%
3 AA 0.00404 16.439 0% 44% 56%
3 Y 0.0075 6.997 0% 39% 61%
3 Y 0.00692 6.997 0% 39% 61%
3 Y 0.00692 6.997 0% 39% 61%
3 Y 0.00692 6.997 0% 39% 61%
3 JJ 0.00691 3.980 0% 100% 0%
3 JJ 0.00691 3.980 0% 100% 0%
3 JJ 0.00691 3.980 0% 100% 0%
3 JJ 0.00691 3.980 0% 100% 0%
3 JJ 0.00691 3.980 0% 100% 0%
3 JJ 0.00879 3.980 0% 100% 0%
3 QQ 0.00612 4.698 0% 95% 5%
3 QQ 0.00612 4.698 0% 95% 5%
3 QQ 0.00612 4.698 0% 95% 5%
3 QQ 0.00612 4.698 0%/o 95% 5%
3 QQ 0.00612 4.698 0% 95% 5%
3 QQ 0.00612 4.698 0% 95% 5%
3 QQ 0.00612 4.698 0% 95% 5%
3 QQ 0.00612 4.698 0% 95% 5%
3 QQ 0.00612 4.698 0% 95% 5%
3 TT 0.00577 6.062 0%/o 100% 0%
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Cost($) I Driving % % % Dirt/DP FDP km Time (hrs) Paved Gravel Other
3 TT 0.00577 6.062 0% 100% 0%
3 WW 0.00465 10.483 0% 61% 39%
3 WW 0.00465 10.483 0% 61% 39%
3 WW 0.00465 10.483 0% 61% 39%
3 WW 0.00495 10.483 0% 61% 39%
3 WW 0.00495 10.483 0% 61% 39%
3 WW 0.00481 10.483 0% 61% 39%
3 WW 0.00481 10.483 0% 61% 39%
3 XX 0.00759 9.144 0% 2% 98%
3 XX 0.00759 9.144 0% 2% 98%
3 XX 0.00759 9.144 0% 2% 98%
3 XX 0.00759 9.144 0% 2% 98%
3 XX 0.00759 9.144 0% 2% 98%
3 XX 0.00759 9.144 0% 2% 98%
3 XX 0.00759 9.144 0% 2% 98%
3 XX 0.00759 9.144 0% 2% 98%
3 XX 0.00759 9.144 0% 2% 98%
3 XX 0.00759 9.144 0% 2% 98%
3 XX 0.00759 9.144 0% 2% 98%
3 XX 0.00759 9.144 0% 2% 98%
3 XX 0.00759 9.144 0% 2% 98%
3 XX 0.00759 9.144 0% 2% 98%
3 XX 0.00759 9.144 0% 2% 98%
3 I 0.00448 7.153 0% 84% 16%
3 I 0.00448 7.153 0% 84% 16%
3 I 0.00448 7.153 0% 84% 16%
3 I 0.00448 7.153 0% 84% 16%
3 K 0.00486 5.966 0% 83% 17%
3 K 0.00486 5.966 0% 83% 17%
3 K 0.00486 5.966 0% 83% 17%
3 K 0.00486 5.966 0% 83% 17%
3 K 0.00486 5.966 0% 83% 17%
3 K 0.00589 5.966 0% 83% 17%
3 T 0.00192 25.726 0% 73% 27%
3 T 0.00192 25.726 0% 73% 27%
3 T 0.00192 25.726 0% 73% 27%
3 T 0.00192 25.726 0% 73% 27%
3 T 0.00192 25.726 0% 73% 27%
3 KK 0.01066 2.150 0% 98% 2%
3 KK 0.01066 2.150 0% 98% 2%
3 KK 0.01066 2.150 0% 98% 2%
3 KK 0.01066 2.150 0% 98% 2%
3 KK 0.01066 2.150 0% 98% 2%
3 KK 0.01066 2.150 0% 98% 2%
3 KK 0.01066 2.150 0% 98% 2%
3 KK 0.01066 2.150 0% 98% 2%
3 KK 0.01066 2.150 0% 98% 2%
3 KK 0.01066 2.150 0% 98% 2%
3 KK 0.01066 2.150 0% 98% 2%
3 KK 0.01066 2.150 0% 98% 2%
%
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APPENDIX D: THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME - GUINEA BISSAU
We spoke with Hyoung-Joon Lim a WFP Program Officer currently on leave studying at the Kennedy
School of Government. He has worked in Laos, Honduras, and Guinea Bissau. Since Guinea Bissau is
located in Africa, we focused on it to make the least variable comparison.
Guinea Bissau has a background of political instability and tensions, including a Coup D'6tat. Because of
this, the WFP works without much government assistance or interference. The lack of government
monitoring greatly distinguishes WFP operations in Guinea Bissau from those in Ethiopia.
WFP has two of its own ten ton trucks for use in the distribution of aid. Additionally, the operation
employs long-term and short-term contract combinations with external carriers to complete the
distributions. Instead of traveling with mandated military escorts, the carriers wait for security clearance
from the UN, which tracks the country climate by radio, with two days advance notice and then are on
their way. However, other than during the Coup D'6tat, the UN had routinely given clearance.
The trucks are tracked by radio and the aid-inventory is tracked manually by a "Way Bill". All warehouse
managers, carriers, and aid recipient representatives must sign this document and testify to the amount
of food-aid received. WFP officials will randomly monitor distribution points to ensure the proper
distribution of aid to all beneficiaries.
Finally, the recipient representatives (often school teachers) must also record the number, gender, and
age of the beneficiaries so that WFP can track its reach. A Japanese company had donated a satellite
basted technology that could be used to send this information directly to WFP home office in Bissau.
However, though the technology was very simple, the lack of staff members or government officials
available for repeated trainings made it difficult for teachers to use.
The WFP in Guinea Bissau only has two warehouses. Procurement of food normally takes about four
months, as the food comes from Asia. However, in the case of a broken pipeline (most often due to
resource limitations), the Guinea Bissau operation can apply for emergency funding from WFP
headquarters, called IFP funding, or from the UN headquarters, called CRF funding, both for $500,000.
This funding will be distributed within 72 hours.
APPENDIX E: US ARMY OPERATIONS AND USE OF TECHNOLOGY IN IRAQ
AND AFGHANISTAN
The United States Army operates throughout a spectrum of conflicts ranging from domestic support and
relief, to humanitarian operations, peacekeeping efforts, and war. Army operations often take place in
regions that are considered to be dangerous or hostile and the Army is therefore forced to address
significant risk throughout the entirety of its supply chain. This section will introduce the US Army's
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as two tactics that the Army has pursued to mitigate security
risk for ground transportation
Operations in Iraq
In Iraq, oil is distributed under heavy surveillance. Convoys are enforced and military escorts are used
for deliveries to US Forces. For example, US Army National Guard security forces brigades (SECFOR) are
dedicated to securing the ground lines of communication. The Main Supply Route (MSR) coming from
Kuwait has been heavily guarded since insurgents destroyed bridges along the route causing it to shut
down early on. The route coming from the West is considered to be less dangerous and therefore only
requires escorts as the convoys approach the central part of Iraq. The Army has nearly 1000 deliveries
of rations per day and has three supporting warehouses in Iraq. Although the Army has attempted to
move supplies by railway, they have repeatedly been targets for insurgents and therefore, food is
delivered by contractors via ground transportation.
Operations in Afghanistan
Logistics operations in Afghanistan differ greatly from those in Iraq. The operating environment is the
key driving force behind the need for alternate operations. In addition to the extremely difficult terrain
that blankets Afghanistan, the country also has a limited road network and poor infrastructure.
Afghanistan is very susceptible to severe effects from weather, insurgency, and political and economic
problems. The Army has four times more troops in Iraq than Afghanistan, contributing to the limited
combat logistics patrols in Afghanistan. Although it is a small operation, it is very dangerous and with
the limited number of troops and increased risk, the Army opted to contract out the responsibility of
distributing oil. Since the distribution of oil is handled entirely by the Army's three prime contractors,
military escorts are not used as they are in Iraq. Additionally, local Afghani truck drivers are often used
as sensors to gain valuable route intelligence.
Even with contractors handling the distribution of oil, there have still been some instances of disruption
of service. 240 contractors have gone missing while delivering goods to the Army in Afghanistan. There
is also potential for corruption as contractors are paid upon the delivery of the oil. In response, the
Army has begun taking X-rays of the trucks to ensure that they were indeed filled to the appropriate
level.
Operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan have also experienced delays in service at the border crossings.
The Khyber Pass has been closed several times at the Torkham border between Pakistan and
Afghanistan causing re-routing and delays in service. The border between Iraq and Turkey (another
supplier of oil) has occasionally been backed up for distances of 23 or 24 miles. This results in wait times
of a couple of weeks just to cross the border into Iraq.
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Restricted Distribution using Air Transportation
A method being actively pursued is the ability to use aerial resupply methods. During Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, roughly 220-360 containers of supplies were airdropped per
day, resulting in a cost of $25 million. This cost of using this Container Delivery System (CDS) was
particularly high since the containers and parachutes used were non-recoverable and thus severely
depleted the stock of equipment used to perform aerial resupply. (Shopalovich, 2005). The Army is now
looking into more efficient methods of airdropping supplies including: the Low Cost Aerial Delivery
System (LCADS), the Low Cost Low Altitude (LCLA) aerial resupply, and the Free drop Packaging Concept
Project (FPCP).
The Low Cost Aerial Delivery System (LCADS)
The Low Cost Aerial Delivery System (LCADS) program was initiated as a direct result of OEF in
Afghanistan. The goal of the program was to develop and field a low cost alternative for the
Container Delivery System (CDS). The Army developed new parachutes and containers to
reduce costs by 55% while maintaining the same performance, accuracy, and survivability of
CDS. LCADS can release cargo weighing between 500-2,200 pounds using low velocity airdrop
(500-1,250 feet above ground level) or high velocity airdrop (15,000-25,000 feet above sea
level). (Shopalovich, 2005).
Low Cost Low Altitude (LCLA)
Low Cost Low Altitude (LCLA) aerial resupply containers are airdropped at lower altitudes than
LCADS when normal resupply methods, such as ground transportation, are not feasible.
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Airdropping cargo weighing up to 350 pounds from an altitude of 150-500 feet above ground
level increases the accuracy of the delivery and results in less damage to the supplies.
Additionally, it minimizes the size of the drop zone, the load dispersion at the drop zone, and
the size of the force required to secure the drop zone. One of the goals of LCLA is to reduce
the Army's logistics footprint. Dropping supplies less than 50 meters from the designated drop
zone with 100% survivability of cargo allows for the easy recovery of loads by two soldiers in
under two minutes. This provides a less costly, more rapid, and more accurate delivery of
supplies while decreasing the exposure of troops while recovering airdropped supplies. (Zello &
Labin, 2008)
Free drop Packaging Concept Project (FPCP)
Despite reduced costs of parachutes using LCADS and LCLA, the parachutes and containers are
still typically used only once. Therefore, the Army is developing a method to drop supplies
without needing a parachute at all. The Free drop Packaging Concept Project is a facet of LCLA
aerial resupply in which 50-150 pounds of cargo are dropped from 50-75 feet above ground
level in special energy-absorbing containers that prevent damage to the supplies upon impact.
(US Army Logistics Innovation Agency, 2009)
The Army Movement Tracking System (MTS)
The Army has invested in technology measures to enhance security throughout their supply chain.
Solutions range from weigh stations to monitor contract carriers, to autonomous guidance units (AGUs)
to help guide airdropped supplies, to extensive use of GPS and RFID to monitor vehicles, containers, and
individual units. The Movement Tracking System (MTS) was developed to provide greater asset
visibility on a battlefield that was becoming increasingly digitized. The two main components of MTS
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include a mobile unit that can be installed in vehicles and laptop control stations which remains at
headquarters. MTS communicates through satellites and is used primarily to track military logistics
convoys and supplies. (Weigner, H.E. & Laudan, J.E., 2005)
MTS provides reliable communication capability, such as pre-formatted text messages, through satellite
communication, even when radios or other forms of communications are unavailable. MTS enabled
vehicles and control stations can communicate with each other at all times, allowing soldiers and
leaders to manage missions more efficiently. Communicating information, potential changes in routes
or missions, and other valuable information can be done throughout the duration of the mission itself.
(Weigner, H.E. & Laudan, J.E., 2005). In addition to MTS' ability to track vehicles, it has an RFID function
which enables in-transit visibility of the supplies being transported by those vehicles. Active RFID tags
on cargo or containers are read by an RFID interrogator which is embedded in the MTS unit. This allows
control stations to closely monitor the distribution of cargo all the way to its final destination and
redirect shipments as necessary. (Weigner, H.E. & Laudan, J.E., 2005).
Although there are numerous benefits from using MTS, there are also several challenges. Satellite
systems are reliable for communication purposes; however, procuring satellite coverage is expensive
and can be difficult depending on geographic region. Another difficulty is determining an appropriate
level of security. MTS abides by security requirements outlined by the Army, but also must ensure that
the right information is getting to the right personnel at the right time. A system such as MTS would not
be useful if only partial information were communicated while at the same time could be dangerous if
too much information were broadcasted and ended up in the wrong hands.
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Conclusion
The United States Army has a record of conducting operations in some of the most dangerous parts of
the world; however, there is no single solution that can be applied from one region to another. The
Army is fortunate to have a number of products, methods, and technologies that can be used to
mitigate risk and improve efficiency, safety, and visibility. Monitoring contractor vehicles through weigh
stations and x-rays provide basic confidence that goods are being transported properly. Technology
such as MTS provides a high level of asset visibility throughout the battlefield and modernized aerial
delivery systems provide a means to supply areas difficult to reach via the ground in a cost effective and
accurate manner. All of these provide the Army with options which can be implemented in different
regions according to mission goals, assets, resources, and risk.
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APPENDIX F: THE AMERICAN RED CROSS AND GPS
The American Red Cross (ARC) has hundreds of Emergency Response Vehicles (ERVs) that are
responsible for bringing aid in disaster and emergency situations. Previously, ARC had trouble with the
accountability of the ERVs in emergency situations. Without technology, ARC had no visibility into where
the vehicles were at any moment or how long it would take the vehicles to reach an emergency area.
This necessity became more apparent after Hurricane Katrina.
To solve this problem, the ARC team installed Global Positioning System (GPS) units on every vehicle and
trailer about 5 years ago. For $350 a unit, ARC installed GPS units the size of a Kleenex box to gather
data and transmit it to the Orbit1 web-based system. The system includes geo-fencing. Data from Orbit1
is consolidated into a spreadsheet and distributed to stakeholders. Unfortunately, no cost-benefit
analysis was done before installing these units. The security and visibility provided by GPS units was
deemed so necessary that a cost-benefit analysis was unnecessary.
There are several challenges to the GPS units. Firstly, many of the truck drivers did not realize that their
vehicles were being tracked until much after installation. This, of course, took them by surprise and
caused a negative reaction. Also, since the Red Cross distributed the units to the different chapters, it is
the chapters that became responsible for the implementation of the units onto the vehicles.
Unfortunately, many of these chapters were very busy and did not deploy the GPS units onto each
vehicle. Clearly, this decreased the utility of the units and the web system.
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Additionally, ARC equipped each ERV with a pink cellular phone. These phones were added at almost
zero cost thanks to AT&T. By making these phones pink, ARC has increased their security measures; each
phone is immediately recognizable as an ERV phone and because of the stigma attached to the pink
color, the phones have low re-sale value.
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APPENDIX G: MIT's POTHOLE PATROL- USING ACCELEROMETERS TO
IDENTIFY POTHOLES
CarTel (car telecommunications) is an MIT research project that was initiated in 2004-2005 to monitor
infrastructure on or along roadways through the use of sensors. Prior to CarTel, most efforts to monitor
infrastructure were based on traffic flow analysis using sensors, such as cameras, along the side of the
road. Road conditions have also been monitored using cameras (to take pictures of potholes) or laser
sensors (to measure depth of potholes). The CarTel project intended to investigate applications of
sensor technology that were not currently being pursued to monitor roads. The Pothole Patrol opted to
use accelerometers to measure the dynamic velocity of vehicles in 3 directions: front and back, up and
down, and side to side.
The Pothole Patrol installed wireless devices containing 3-axis accelerometers inside the glove
compartment of 10 taxis in Boston and Cambridge, Massachusetts. External GPS devices were also
mounted on the taxis. GPS data was collected once a second and accelerometer data was collected 600
times per second. This data was then transmitted through a wireless connection for analysis using
algorithms to perform statistical analysis to identify events; a method called machine learning.
In order for the algorithm to work properly, the Pothole Patrol drove a car over numerous potholes to
gather training data - data that is known to be associated with a specific event. The training data was
fed into an algorithm along with characteristics that might be indicative of potholes. The algorithm
compared the data collected from the taxis to the training data to identify potential potholes on the
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roads. In one week 4,800 bad surface locations were identified in Boston and Cambridge (Pothole
Patrol, 2007).
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FIGURE A.1: A map showing some of the locations of the Pothole Patrol's identified "potholes"
Source: Pothole Patrol (2007)
FIGURE A.2: Photos of the identified "potholes", including some false positives
Source: Pothole Patrol (2007)
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As seen in Figure A.2, one of the challenges the Pothole Patrol incurred was ensuring the accuracy of the
data collected. For instance, manholes, drains, speed bumps, and other obstacles caused spikes in
waveforms as well. The Pothole Patrol had to determine how to filter false positives out by
differentiating potholes from other things on the road. It was determined that potholes have a
signature waveform; data looks quite different when a vehicle hits a pothole (which typically happens on
one side of the car) rather than an obstruction that crosses the entire street, such as a speed bump. The
Pothole Patrol's results included a false positive rate of less than 5%. (Pothole Patrol, 2007).
The use of accelerometers in the Pothole Patrol's experiment produced an effective method in which to
measure road conditions through embedding sensors in vehicles. Using accelerometers in conjunction
with GPS devices, the Pothole Patrol was able to accurately locate potholes, and other obstructions, that
were affecting vehicles in Cambridge and Boston. The application of accelerometers was useful for
determining the dynamic velocity and vibration of the vehicles and has proven to be an effective tool for
measuring road conditions.
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APPENDIX H: THE ARMY AND AIR FORCE EXCHANGE SERVICE
The Army & Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), the retailing agency for the US Army and Air Force,
provides commercial and non-commercial merchandise and services to several military bases around
the world.
In particular, AAFES transports goods to Iraq and Afghanistan where security and infrastructure
concerns are similar to the World Food Programme's concerns in the Somali region. Like the World Food
Programme, AAFES moves perishable goods and food-items into these areas with little transportation
infrastructure, unreliable weather, and security issues. Not only are the roads into these areas harsh,
but pilfering activities can cost truckloads of merchandise. Also like the World Food Programme, AAFES
uses technology to secure its goods. In Iraq and Afghanistan both, the organization is trying out different
technologies and methodologies. However, unlike the World Food Programme, AAFES will not rely on
technology alone to secure its items on the dangerous journey to the bases.
In Iraq, AAFES employs Global Positioning System (GPS) and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
technologies to track their goods. GPS equipment for text messaging and sensors that react to light,
door, and seal sensitivity of products help specialists know if the transport of the goods has been
interrupted in some way. RFID tags on each container and frequent interrogators en route allow
specialists to know the recent whereabouts of the goods at all time. However, the organization does not
feel that it can depend on these devices solely to provide security information or visibility. Therefore,
AAFES also moves with the US Army convoys. Because AAFES is not always considered high priority,
their merchandise can wait up to two weeks for military escort. Though disruptive to the lead time, it is
through this method that safety and some security of items is guaranteed. High risk items, such as iPods
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or cigarettes, are flown into Iraq, but merchandise and food items, as would be similar to the WFP, are
delivered in this manner. Otherwise, in order to combat these long lead times, the bases have large
quantities of safety stock.
To get merchandise and goods into Afghanistan, AAFES must first ship its items to Pakistan. However, as
there is no US Military presence in Pakistan, AAFES must transport its merchandise here without military
escort. There is only one road into Afghanistan and it is often held up by traffic, bad weather, and
generally poor infrastructure problems. The direction of traffic flow changes everyday - eastward traffic
goes one day and westward traffic goes the next. Because of these long transit times, the DCs try to pick
the freshest of the perishable products for the long journeys and build the safety stocks at the military
bases. While AAFES has tried many different security measures, they have not found the mix that they
think will work right in this area. The organization has tried some GPS tracking and periodic weighing
stations, where security is maintained by knowing that the weight of goods over the journey has been
maintained. However, the pilfering activities in this area are thrifty and quick and have been able to
outlast the technologies.
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